BABU SUMER SINGH Vs. CHAUBE LILADHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiffs claimed that a certain ancestral house which has been attached in execution of a decree against one Chaube Rikhi Lal could not be attached and sold. The plaintiffs were the son and grandson of the said Chaube Rikhi Lal. A decree has been granted against Chaube Rikhi Lal at the suit of the appellant Sumer Singh. The suit instituted by Sumer Singh was a suit on foot of a promissory-note given by Rikhi Lal under the following circumstances. Rikhi Lal had been sued for libel. He was successful in the Court of first instance. On appeal, however, a decree was given against him. He was anxious to file a second appeal to the High Court and having no money Sumer Singh s father went security for him and (sic) obtained the promissory-note. The plaintiffs raised the plea that the debt due to the father of Sumer Singh was not a debt for which a Hindu son and grandson could be held liable. The Court of first instance held that the son and grandson were liable and dismissed the suit. The lower Appellate Court reversed the decree of the Court of first instance and gave the plaintiffs a decree. Hence the present appeal. The learned Judge having referred to certain authorities came to the conclusion that they were so conflicting that he was entitled to follow his own view. The case of Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Harsur 32 B. 384 : 10 Bom. L.R. 297 was one of the authorities cited before the learned Judge and was the authority, which he thought fit to follow. Speaking generally, the debts which a son is not liable to pay are debts incurred for spirituous liquor, gratification of lust or gambling. (Vide Colebrooke s Mitakshara Chapter O1 Section 3, Placitum 47). The text also declares, that a son is not bound to pay any unpaid fines or tolls or idle gifts". In the Bombay case cited above a decree was obtained against the defendant s property caused by a dam erected by the defendant s father and it was sought to execute this very decree against the son. The facts of the present case are, when carefully considered, very different from those in the case cited. It was not sought to execute against the son or grandson a decree for damages for libel. The decree which the decree-holder sought to execute was a decree in a suit on a promissory- note. The promissory-note represented money which the father had borrowed for the purpose of defending himself against a suit for damages. Without expressing any opinion as to whether the case above referred to was or was not rightly decided, we think that the debt in the present case was a debt for which a Hindu son and grandson were liable. We may mention that no one appears on behalf of the respondents. We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court and restore that of the Court of the first instance with costs including fees on the higher scale.