AJODHIA PARSHAD Vs. RAM LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A suit for arrears of rent exceeding Rs. 100 was brought in the Court of an Assistant Collector of the first class and was decreed. In the course of execution proceedings in the same Court the respondents made statements which according to the applicant were false. The applicant then applied to the Assistant Collector for sanction to prosecute the respondent. That officer refused to give sanction and the applicant then went in appeal to the District Judge who threw out the appeal on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to hear it. This is an application for revision of the order of the District Judge. On behalf of the applicant it is contended that the case is governed by Clause (b) of Sub-section 7 of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that on a proper construction of that Clause the District Judge had jurisdiction. It is contended further that he had jurisdiction even if Clause (c) of the same Sub-section is held to be applicable and that one or other of these Clauses must apply to the case. As regards Clause (b) the argument for the applicant is that the case in connection with which the offence is said to have been committed was a suit for rent exceeding Rs. 100 against the decree in which an appeal lay to the District Judge, therefore, the Assistant Collector who refused sanction must be deemed for the present purpose to be subordinate to the District Judge who accordingly ought to have entertained the appeal. To this the respondent s reply that the case in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed was the execution proceeding the order on which was not appealable, therefore, Clause (b) does not apply. The applicant contends that even if Clause (b) is held to be inapplicable Clause (c) cannot apply because the opening words of the Clause "where no appeal" refer only to cases in which no appeal lies against any decisions of the Court and that the words do not mean as contended by (he respondents. "Where no appeal lies in the case in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed." In the alternative the applicant contends that if Clause (c) applies the Court indicated is the Court of the District Judge. To this the respondents reply that the principal Court of original jurisdiction under the Tenancy Act is the Court of the Collector.

(2.) The word "case" has been the subject of many conflicting decisions in connection with Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, and Section 115 of the present Code. I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by a reference to these decisions, for the word must be construed with due regard to the context in which it appears and the purpose for which the section of which it forms part was framed. It was this consideration which led the majority of the Chartered High Courts to place a narrow meaning upon the word "case" in the sections just mentioned. The object of Sub-section 7 of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was to indicate the Court to which a Court giving or refusing sanction to a prosecution should be deemed to be subordinate within the meaning of Sub-section (6). As originally framed, Sub-section (7) provided only that the Court giving or refusing sanction should be deemed to be subordinate only to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lay. This produced a mass of conflicting rulings and Clauses (a), (b) and (e) were added with a view to getting rid of the difficulty. Clause (a) provides for the case of a Subordinate Court against whose decisions appeals lie and two Courts of different grades and is plain enough. Clause (b) provides for the case of a Subordinate Court against whose decision appeals lie to two different kinds of Courts. Here the test is to what Court did an appeal lie in the case in connection with which the offence is allege to have been committed? The word case taken by itself may mean either the original case out of which arose the case of proceeding in which the offence is said to have been committed or the actual proceeding in which the offence is said to have been committed. It must be construed with reference to the context in which it appears. The words are "nature of the case in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed." There being a remote connection with an original suit and an immediate connection with an execution proceeding, I am of opinion that the case in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed is the execution proceeding. According to the decisions of this Court no appeal lies against an order of an Assistant Collector of the first class passed in execution proceedings under the Tenancy Act. The result is that Clause (b) does not apply. Does Clause (c) apply? The opening words of the Clause "where no appeal lies" do not appeal to me to refer to a Court against none of whose decisions an appeal lies but to refer to particular cases in which no appeal lies. The whole Sub-section seems to be confined to Courts against whose decisions or some of whose decisions appeals do lie, for the opening words are "For the purposes of this Section every Court shall be deemed to be subordinate only to the Court to which appeals from the former Court ordinarily lie" (the italics are mine). The result of this construction is, possibly, that the Legislature has made no provision in Section 195 for an appeal against an order of a Small Cause Court giving or refusing sanction and it may be that the only Court which can interfere with such an order is the High Court. This result may not have been contemplated but the construction advocated by the applicant seems to me to be clearly inadmissible. It would have been another matter if Clause (c) had formed a separate sub-section. I hold that Clause (c) applies to the present case and, therefore, the applicant should have appealed to the "principal Court of original jurisdiction." I can discover no justification for reading these words as if they were principal Court of original Civil jurisdiction" The Clause applies to all classes of cases and it is impossible to suppose that the Legislature intended the principal Court of Original Civil jurisdiction to revise the orders of Criminal and Revenue Courts with which it has no concern as a Civil Court. The circumstance that District Judges in this Province, generally, have the power of Sessions Judges and hear appeals in Revenue cases seems to be wholly irrelevant. The principal Court of original jurisdiction under the Tenancy Act is clearly not the Court of the District Judge.

(3.) For the above reasons, I am of opinion that the District Judge was right in declining to entertain the applicant s appeal and I would dismiss this application with costs. Karamat Husain, J.