(1.) We cannot agree with the Subordinate Judge that the word karnavans in the plural in paragraph 3 of the razinamah, exhibit G, was intended to include the karnavans of the three branches. The heads of the three branches are nowhere in exhibit G referred to or recognised as karnavans. Throughout exhibit G only one karnavan is recognised, that is, the karnavan of the whole tarwad (the second defendant) and he is the only signatory who signs as karnavan. The word karnavans in paragraph 3 evidently means the several karnavans of the tarwad in succession and this conclusion is supported by the fact that in their written statement the defendants did not contend that the heads of the branches had the right of appointment under paragraph 3.
(2.) But we think that the Subordinate Judge is right in the second reason which he gives for dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The power of dismissal and appointment given to the karnavan in paragraph 3 of exhibit G is a special power given on the occurrence of a contingency which has never arisen.
(3.) The question remains as to whether the karnavan has an inherent right as karnavan and independently of exhibit G to make an appointment to a trusteeship in the tarwad. No doubt the karnavan, unless specially limited by family usage or agreement, has the power of himself managing the trust property of the tarwad, but we are not aware of any authority for the position that he can appoint another to take his place as trustee, a position clearly opposed to the general law of trusts. No family custom or agreement having been proved in this case, we must hold that the karnavan (second defendant) had no power to appoint the plaintiff to be trustee of the charities in suit.