LAWS(PVC)-1880-7-4

MAHASHOYA SHOSINATH GHOSE Vs. SRIMATI KRISHNA SOONDARI DASI

Decided On July 08, 1880
Mahashoya Shosinath Ghose Appellant
V/S
Srimati Krishna Soondari Dasi Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question in this case is whether the Plaintiff has been validly adopted as the son of Dwarkanath Ghose, who died on the 30th of June, 1863, by his widow, the Defendant. It is admitted that she had authority from her husband for that purpose, and the adoption is alleged to have taken place on the 11th of June, 1864.

(2.) THEIR Lordships do not propose to go at any length into the facts of the case, which are fully and lucidly stated in the two able judgments that are the subjects of this appeal. It is sufficient to refer to a few of them. It appears that the widow lost no time in seeking to carry out her husband's direction to adopt a son. A correspondence, which was carried on chiefly by Soorjonarain Singh, her brother, who took the principal part in all these transactions, began in January, 1864; from which it appears that, whatever unwillingness Srinarain, the natural father of the Plaintiff, may have felt at first to give his son in adoption, had been overcome before the end of the following May. The record contains only the letters written by Soorjonarain during this period; But from them it may be inferred that Srinarain, in one or other of his letters that are missing, had stipulated for the execution of deeds and gift of acceptance which, if witnessed as was contemplated by the reversionary heirs of Dwarkanath Ghose, would afford evidence against them of the adoption and of the authority under which it was made. It may also be inferred that at one time it was contemplated that the Defendant should send persons to bring the boy, without his father, to her house at Bhagulpore from Mahta, his father's place of residence, in order that she might see him before adopting him. Ultimately, however, Srinarain himself accompanied the boy, and came to Bhagulpore on the 7th of June, 1864; and it may be that there was at that time some notion in the minds of all the parties that the adoption would then take place. However this may be, it is an undisputed fact that the deeds upon the construction of which the determination of this appeal must now depend were executed on the 11th of June, 1864. It is, on the other hand, equally clear, that the boy, instead of remaining with the Defendant in her house, went back with his natural father to Mahta on the following day, the 12th of June, 1864. He afterwards returned to the Defendant's house, together with his brothers, who at least were only there on a visit, in September, 1864, whilst Srinarain was on a pilgrimage. The brothers went home in November, but the boy remained in the house of the Defendant. There appears to have been on the part of the father some remonstrance as to this, or, at all events, the expression of a wish that the boy should be sent back to him; and accordingly the boy was sent back to his father's house, in December, 1864, as it was expressly stated in the letter which, accompanied him on his return, agreeably to his father's order. After that period he never returned to the Defendant's house. Further correspondence ensued, and ultimately, on the 25th of March, 1865, Srinarain himself wrote a letter, in which, after stating the boy's repugnance to leave his own home, the repugnance probably being that of his mother to part with him, and the general feeling of the family, he ends by saying: "In this I have no power, as I have already informed you in my previous letter; and now I positively inform you that you all, relinquishing this hope, in consideration of the future, for the preservation of the estate, should make dattak-grahan (accepting a son in adoption) or any other arrangement you think fit:" pointing evidently to the adoption of another child by the Defendant.

(3.) SO matters remained until the Plaintiff came of age, and he then brought the present suit to enforce his rights as an adopted son.