CHELIKANI KONDAYYA RAO Vs. UPPALAPATI NAGANNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellants are the mokhasadars of a village falling within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam. On the 7 October, 1920, they sold to the first respondent the kudivaram right in their kambattam, or home farm lands, on; conditions to which I shall refer in some detail presently. On the 31 March, 1934, the appellants filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam for the recovery of the rent due by the sale of the lands. It was contended by the respondents that by the deed of the 7 October, 1920, the, appellants had converted the lands from kambattam into ryoti lands and consequently the Revenue Court, not the Civil Court, had jurisdiction. Before the Subordinate Judge the appellants admitted that the village was an "estate" within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, as amended in 1936, but they averred that the village was not an estate within the meaning of the Act as it stood at the time of the contract with the first respondent, and an issue was framed on the question. It is, however, impossible for the appellants to maintain this contention. By admitting that the lands in suit are kambattam lands within a mokhasa village, it follows that the village was an "estate" within the meaning of the Madras Estates, Land Act, even before the amendment in 1936, and the appeal must proceed on this basis. The Subordinate Judge upheld the respondents contention that there had been a conversion and dismissed the suit. On appeal to this Court, Wadsworth, J., concurred in these decisions and this appeal is from his judgment.

(2.) Section 181 of the Madras Estates Land Act before the amendment of the Act stated that nothing in Secs.6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 19 and 46 should confer a right of occupancy in, or should apply in any way to, a landholder's private land. Then followed a proviso to the effect that nothing contained in the section should prevent a landholder from converting his private land into ryoti land. Until private land was converted into ryoti land the landholder could deal with it as he liked and that is still the position, although the wording of the section has been altered. Section 19 has throughout been to the effect that except as provided in the Act, the relations between a landholder and a tenant of his private land are not regulated by the Act. There was nothing in the Act as it stood before 1936, nor is there anything in it now, which prevents a landholder from leasing his private land on whatever terms he may think fit, but, of course, if he leases it on terms which imply a conversion of the land into ryoti land all the provisions of the Act with regard to ryoti land will apply and will overrule any provisions in the lease which are in conflict with the provisions of the Act, I may here attention that apart from Section 181 the amended Act is on all fours with the measure as It stood before 1936 so far as this case is concerned.

(3.) In Rajendramani Devi Garu V/s. Yellappa Ramu Naidu (1920)39 M.L.J 565, a Division Bench of this Court had to consider the terms of a conversion of private land into ryoti land and the judgment appears to go to the length of saying that the terms of a conversion can be enforced even if they are inconsistent with ryoti tenure. It was observed that Section 181 contemplated a conversion from home farm land into ryoti land, but that the Legislature had not made any special provision with regard to the terms on which the conversion might be made. It was on this line of reasoning that the Court held that the contract between the parties was enforceable. In my opinion this is going much too far. When there is a conversion of private land into ryoti land the terms of the contract which are not inconsistent with ryoti tenure can be enforced, but once the conversion has taken place the tenant has all the rights given to a ryot by the Act, and if the rent fixed is unfair the remedies contemplated by the Act are open to him.