VENKATESWARA SARMA, STYLED GNANASIVACHARIA SWAMIGAL, MATATHIPATHI AND GURU OF PERUR MEL MUTT, FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF THE MUTT Vs. SNVENKATESA AIYAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Full Bench has been constituted to decide the following questions: (1) Where a manager of a Hindu religious institution makes an alienation of the property of the institution for valuable consideration and the succeeding manager seeks to impeach that alienation by suit, will Art. 134-B apply when there is an interval of time between the death, resignation or removal of the previous manager and the election or appointment of the subsequent manager? (2) If such succeeding manager happens to be a minor at the date of his election or appointment, will he be entitled to the benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act? (3) If Art. 144 be held applicable to the case, when does adverse possession commence? Is it from the date of the election or appointment of the succeeding manager or from, the date of the death, resignation or removal of the previous manager who effected the alienation?

(2.) The reference arises out of Appeal No. 26 of 1937, which was preferred from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore. The suit was instituted by the Mahant, or Matathipathi, of the Perur Math to recover possession of certain immovable properties belonging to the math which had been alienated by his immediate predecessor, one Sivasubramania Swamigal. The last alienation took place in 1910. Sivasubramania Swamigal died on the 15 July, 1918, and the suit was not instituted until the 12 April, 1934. The appointment to the office of mahant rests with the disciples of the mathy but they did not appoint a successor to Sivasubramania Swamigal until the 7 June, 1922, nearly four years after his death. The defendants raised the plea that the suit was barred by limitation their contention being that Art. 134-B of the Limitation Act applied. The plaintiff maintained that the appropriate article was Art. 144 and that time only began to run from the date of his appointment. He was a minor at the time of his appointment and did not attain his majority until the 6 May, 1931. It was in these circumstances that it was said that Section 6 of the Limitation Act had application. The Subordinate Judge decided against the plaintiff and he appealed to this Court. The appeal came before Venkataramana Rao and Abdur Rahman, JJ., who were inclined to take different views on the question of limitation and both have set forward their reasons for making this reference. They have discussed all relevant authorities and an elaborate examination of them is not called for. It will be sufficient to examine the questions which arise and to refer merely to the governing factors.

(3.) Art. 134-B which falls in Part VIII of the Schedule to the Limitation Act states that the period of limitation for a suit by the manager of a Hindu, Mahomedan or Buddhist religious of charitable endowment to recover possession of immovable property comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration shall be twelve years and that time shall begin to run from the death, resignation or removal of the transferor. Art. 144 is the residuary article in Part VIII of the Schedule. It prescribes a period of twelve years for a suit for the possession of immovable property or any interest therein not otherwise specially provided for in the Act, the period of limitation starting from the time when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Art. 134-B was inserted in the Limitation Act by the amending Act of 1929. It is accepted by both sides that the object of its insertion was to put an end to judicial conflict. The conflict was whether in a suit by a manager of a math for possession of immovable property belonging to the endowment which had been transferred by his predecessor time began to run from the date of the alienation or from the date of the death of the alienor. By inserting Art. 134-B the Legislature has made , the starting point the death, resignation or removal from office of the transferor. Independent of the amendment of the statute the Privy Council in 1933 in its judgment in Mahant Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal (1933) 64 M.L.J. 505 : L.R. 60 I.A. 124 : I.L.R. 12 Pat. 251 (P.C) also decided that this should be the starting point. There the Privy Council held that where a mahant has alienated math property the possession of the alienee does not become adverse during the tenure of office of the mahant and limitation only begins to run from the time when the mahant ceases to hold office. The question was whether Art. 134 or Art. 144 applied and the decision was that the proper article was Art. 144. The appeal in Mahant Ram Charan Das V/s. Naurangi Lal(1933) 64 M.L.J. 505 : L.R. 60 I.A. 124 : I.L.R. 12 Pat. 251 (P.C.) was heard after the amendment of the Act in 1929, but the suit had been instituted before the amendment and therefore Art. 134-B had no application. A mahant is not a trustee in the English sense, as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Vidya Varuthi V/s. Balusami Aiyar (1921) 41 M.L.J. 346 : L.R. 48 I.A. 302 : I.L.R. 44 Mad. 831 (P.C.). He has the right to the enjoyment of the properties during his lifetime, subject, of course, to the necessities of the math, and that is why in that case and in Mahant Ram Charan Das V/s. Naurangi Lal (1933) 64 M.L.J. 505 : L.R. 60 I.A. 124 : I.L.R. 12 Pat. 251 (P.C.), the Privy Council held that the starting point of limitation was the date when the mahant vacated the office, and no doubt similar considerations operated when the Legislature decided to insert Art. 134-B in the Limitation Act.