MIR AKHATAR HOSSAIN Vs. GURUPADA HALDAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In the suit with reference to which this rule arises the plaintiff is suing for a permanent injunction which will have She effect of restraining defendant 1, in that suit, Gurupada Haldar, from executing a decree obtained by him in Suit No. 54 of 1938 of the Additional Munsif's Court of Alipore. The plaintiff valued the relief claimed by him at Rs. 100, but the defendants claimed that this relief had been trader-valued with the result that, on 12 June 1939, the learned Munsif directed that an enquiry should be made under Section 8-C, Court-Fees Act, for the purpose of assessing the proper value of the subject-matter of the suit. In this order the learned Munsif pointed out that any decree which might be obtained by the plaintiff in the Title Suit No. 76 of 1939 would involve to all intents and purposes a declaration of the plaintiff's title to the suit land and that the valuation of the relief would therefore depend upon the value of the land. At a subsequent stage in the proceedings the plaintiff sought to obtain a review of the order of the learned Munsif dated 12 June 1939, but that application was rejected. It appears however that at no stage in the proceedings did the plaintiff move this Court for the revision of the order, dated 12 June 1939. The record shows that evidence was taken in pursuance of the order for an enquiry under Section 8-C, Court-fees Act, and that, in due course, the trial Court held that the relief sought by the plaintiff should be valued according to the value of the plaintiff's land which would be affected by the injunction, i.e. at Rs. 3500. This valuation placed the suit beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trying Court, so an order was made to the effect that the plaint should be returned for presentation in the proper Court. An appeal was then taken to the lower Appellate Court and the learned Subordinate Judge has held that the view taken by the trial Court was correct.

(2.) In this Court it has been argued that the plaintiff should be allowed to place his own valuation, namely Rs. 100 on the relief claimed by him because, as there is no objective standard for the valuation of this relief and it is consequently impossible to value it. With this contention I am not prepared to agree. In a case of this sort the objective standard of valuation must be taken to be represented by the extent to which the plaintiff will be benefited if he succeeds in his suit. Having regard to the facts of this particular case and the previous history of the property for the protection of which the plaintiff wishes to claim a permanent injunction, it would appear prima facie that, although this property is in the possession of the plaintiff, it would be of very little value to him unless he is able to obtain the permanent injunction for which he is now suing. As things now stand, without such injunction he would be harassed as a result of the proceedings which would be taken by defendant 1, Gurupada Haldar, to put his decree into execution, and even if he succeeded in retaining possession of the property during the course of the execution proceedings, he would also be faced with the possibility of a civil suit being brought against him by the decree-holder for the establishment of the latter's title. This being the case, it would be necessary during the course of an enquiry under Section 8-C, Court-fees Act, to estimate the value to the plaintiff of the land, which is the subject-matter of this suit, without the permanent injunction which is now sought by him, and also on the assumption that a permanent injunction could be obtained. The difference in the amounts of these two estimates would be the measure of the value of the relief sought by the plaintiff and it would be according to the figure thus obtained that the plaintiff's suit should be valued.

(3.) There might be some difficulty in arriving at a proper valuation in connection with a matter of this sort, but I do not think that it would be impossible to do so, as people acquainted with the land would probably be in a position to estimate the approximate value of the land as it stands at present, and as it would be if the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining a permanent injunction in respect thereof. The enquiry which was held under Section 8-C, Court-fees Act, appears to have proceeded on the wrong assumption that the land in respect of which the injunction is sought is at present entirely valueless to the plaintiff, but it overlooked the fact that the plaintiff's title thereto, although clouded, has not been set aside and it must therefore have some value to farm which it should be possible to estimate. Having regard to the observations made above the orders of the Courts below must be set aside and the matter must be remitted to the trial Court in order that a further enquiry may be made under Section 8-C, Court-fees Act, in the light of the above observations. Whatever the result of the enquiry may be, the petitioner will bear the costs of the hearing in this Court which are assessed at five gold mohurs to be divided equally between the opposite party and the Province of Bengal. The petitioner will also be liable for the costs which have been incurred up to date in the Courts below, as these costs are mainly due to the petitioner's failure to move this Court in revision against the order of the learned Munsif, dated 12 June 1939. Only the opposite party will be entitled to these costs.