RACHAMADUGU NARAYANASWAMI CHETTI Vs. RVENKATA REDDI (DIED)

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a revision from an order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge of Chittoor dismissing an application made by a judgment-debtor under the Debt Conciliation Act with the object of securing a stay of execution of a mortgage decree passed against him. The two grounds on which the execution Court refused to accede to the petitioner's (request were (1) that Section 25 of the Act did not apply to execution proceedings, (2) that a decree passed on the basis of a mortgage-deed does not fall within the purview of the Debt Conciliation Act.

(2.) As to the first ground of the learned Subordinate Judge's decision, I find the words in Section 25 to be quite general and apparently intended to cover every proceeding, whether in the nature of an execution or otherwise. An application for execution, although arising out of a suit after a decree is passed therein is none the less a proceeding and there seems to be no justification for restricting the words only to miscellaneous proceedings other than those in execution. The words of the section leave no scope for the argument that the proceedings must necessarily be independent of the suit in which the decree was passed. As to the second ground, the learned Subordinate Judge's attention does not seem to have been drawn to the definition of the word debt which has been given in Section 2(f) of the Debt Conciliation Act. A debt has been defined to cover a secured debt as well and whether it is payable under a decree of a Civil Court or otherwise. A secured debt has been defined in Sub-clause (1) of the same section to include a mortgage-debt or any debt for which there is security, lien or charge on immovable property. The result of these definitions would be that "when an application has been made to a Board under Section 4, any suit or other proceeding, including a proceeding in execution of a decree, pending before a Civil Court in respect of any debt, secured or otherwise, for the settlement of which application has been made cannot be proceeded with until the Board has dismissed the application. A reference to Section 18(3) and Section 19(4)(b) appears to be beside the point. Section 18(3) only provides that certain decrees would not be executable after the registration of an agreement under Section 14 (2) against the assets set apart in the agreement until all amounts recorded as payable under such agreements have been paid. Section 19(4)(b) makes an application for execution of a decree suspended under Section 18(3) to be unexecutable by a Civil Court. Neither of these sections have any relevancy to the consideration of the question to be decided in this case; or suggest an inference that a secured creditor stands in any position different from that of a simple creditor so far as Section 25 is concerned.

(3.) A Division Bench of this Court took the same view in Hirannayya v. Thippeswami (1938) 2 M.L.J. 1032. This is binding on me. It is true that it does not consider the points raised in this, revision specifically; but unless that was the opinion of the learned Judges, they could not have arrived at the decision to which they did.