GADI NAGOJI PATIL Vs. TRILOK CHAND MULCHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE decree-holders, who obtained a decree against the judgment-debtor who is an agriculturist in the year 1930, were proceeding with their execution and had attached certain livestock, namely the cattle belonging to the judgment-debtor. While the execution proceedings were thus continuing, the Central Provinces and Berar Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, 1938 came into force. Under Section 3 of that Act the judgment-debtor applied for payment of 1/20th of the total amount of the decree remaining unpaid and prayed that on such payment the execution of the decree should be stayed, and the livestock belonging to the judgment-debtor that were attached should be released from attachment. This application was made by the judgment-debtor on 20th August 1938 and Rs. 9-2-0 were deposited immediately and Rs. 9-3-0 were paid to the pleader of the decree-holders on 27th September 1938. The judgment-debtor thus complied with the terms of Section 3 of that Act. Thereupon on 26th November 1938 the Court dismissed the execution application as partly satisfied but ordered that the attachment shall continue as the cattle attached are not livestock within the meaning of Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act and as the judgment-debtor is a dishonest debtor whose object is merely to avoid payment of the debt.

(2.) THE word 'livestock' is not defined in the Central Provinces and Berar Act, No. 16 of 1938, nor can I find a definition in the Civil Procedure Code. We have therefore to look to the dictionary meaning of the word 'livestock'. Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary gives the meaning as "domestic animals, especially, horses, cattle, sheep and pigs." The cattle belonging to the judgment-debtor were thus livestock. I fail to understand as to why the Judge says that the cattle of the judgment-debtor are not livestock within the meaning of the Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act of 1938. Clause 3 of Section 3 of that Act enacts that all attachments of growing crops, agricultural produce, livestock and other moveable property of a perishable nature made in execution of decrees the execution of which has been stayed under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), and existing on the date on which an unconditional stay order is passed, or on which conditional stay order becomes absolute, shall be withdrawn. It appears to me that the Court read the words "of a perishable nature" along with the word "livestock." Those words appear to be intended to qualify other moveable property. I therefore hold that the cattle of the judgment-debtor that were attached were livestock within the meaning of Clause 3 of Section 3, Central Provinces and Berar Act, 16 of 1938 and the judgment-debtor was entitled to ask for their release from the attachment.