DULHIN JANAK NANDINI KUNWARI Vs. KEDAR NARAIN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application requesting this Court to set aside in revision an order passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge of Ballia on 24 August 1939. The applicant, Dulhin Janak Nandini Kunwari was the plaintiff in a suit in which she sought a declaration of her title to the Ausanganj Estate which was under the management of the Court of Wards at Ghazipur. In the course of this suit she made an application for the appointment of a receiver upon the ground that the Court of Wards was about to deliver over the estate to the defendant, B. Kedar Narain Singh. The Court fixed a date on which it proposed to dispose of the application and passed an order on 25 March 1939, restraining the defendant from taking possession of the estate in the meantime. It was alleged by Dulhin Janak Nandini Kunwari that B. Kedar Narain Singh disobeyed this order by making an application to the Court of Wards under Section 10, Court of Wards Act, to release the estate in his favour and she applied to the Court on 15 April 1939 to punish him for contempt. No final order had been passed on Dulhin Janak Nandini Kunwari's application when on 4 August 1939, this Court at the request of B. Kedar Narain Singh transferred the suit from the Court of the Additional Civil Judge of Ballia to the Court of the Civil Judge of Benares. On 24 August 1939, Dulhin Janak Kandini Kunwari made another application to the Additional Civil Judge at Ballia in which she asserted that he still had jurisdiction, in spite of the order of transfer, to deal with the contempt of his injunction and prayed that he should pass orders on her previous application. The learned Additional Civil Judge passed an order in which he held that he had no jurisdiction and it is this order which we are now asked to set aside.

(2.) The learned Additional Civil Judge mentioned incidentally that the order of transfer passed by this Court contained observations which suggested that he no longer had jurisdiction. The order was passed by me and the reference is to a remark that the Court to which the suit was transferred would doubtless deal with the matter of contempt. I made that remark in reference to an argument that I should not transfer the suit because, if I did transfer it, B. Kedar Narain Singh would escape the consequences of his alleged disobedience of the injunction. I meant only to repel that argument on the ground that the transfer of the suit would not put an end to the proceedings for contempt. The question whether the transfer of the suit entailed the transfer of the contempt proceedings was not raised and I did not intend to decide it. The question is still open, although the learned Civil Judge acted quite properly in deferring to an apparent expression of opinion by this Court. It is argued on behalf of the applicant that it is only the Court which issued the injunction which can enforce it. Before dealing with this argument I should like to mention one point. It is doubtless convenient to speak of the proceedings to enforce the injunction as proceedings for contempt, but the terminology is not strictly accurate because the Court of the Additional Civil Judge was not a Court of record and had no power to punish anyone for contempt. He had power only to enforce his order in the manner prescribed by the rules made under the provisions of the Civil P. C..

(3.) The applicant's argument is based on Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 39. In my judgment the sub-rule is not applicable because the injunction must have been issued under Rule 1 and not under Rule 2 of the order. I have no doubt that the provisions in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 must have been intended to apply to injunctions issued under that rule. If they had been intended to apply to injunctions issued under Rule 1, they would have been contained in a separate rule and not in a sub-rule. There is undoubtedly some authority for the applicant's contention that the provisions of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 apply to injunctions issued under Rule 1, but the question has apparently never come before a Court in quite the same way as it has come before us. The first case to which we were referred is the case in Ram Prasad Singh V/s. Benares Bank Limited ( 19) 6 A.I.R. 1919 All. 20. The question at issue was whether the High Court could punish disobedience to its injunction. The learned Judges said that they had no doubt that the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2(3) would apply to an injunction which was not issued under Rule 2, but they also said that the Court in any case could punish under its wide powers as a Court of record and, therefore, the expression of opinion was not a definite ruling.