BOGANATHAM ARUNACHALAM CHETTY Vs. BOGANATHAM KRISHNAVENI AMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal and the memorandum of objections arise out of a suit filed by the plaintiffs as reversioners of the estate of one Kumaraswami Chetti for restraining the first defendant, the mother of the said Kumaraswami Chetti from committing waste of the property inherited by her from her son. The first plaintiff was related to the said Kumaraswami as his great grandfather's brother's son. Plain-tiffs 2 and 3 are the sons of the deceased brothers of the first plaintiff. The first plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit in the lower Court and plaintiffs 2 and 3 were declared as his legal representatives. The second defendant Subbammal is the grandmother of the deceased Kumaraswami Chetti being his father's father's wife. The third defendant is the wife of Kumaraswami's great grandfather. Defendants 2 and 3 are admittedly persons entitled to maintenance out of the estate of Kumaraswami. In the plaint the plaintiff alleged that the first defendant was entirely in the hands of her lather, one Muthukrishna Chettiar, that the bulk of the property was moveable property, being fixed deposits in Banks and that the conduct of the widow was such as to raise a reasonable apprehension that the corpus of the estate would be endangered if the first defendant was allowed to have a free hand with ,the management of the property inherited by her. The first defendant denied that she was guilty of any act of waste and that no case was made out for restraining her right to the possession of the property inherited. The learned District Judge found that on the date? of the death of Kumaraswami Chetti the estate consisted of two houses and a vacant site lying at Vellore and a sum of Rs. 18,500 in the shape of fixed deposits in the Co-operative Urban Bank, Vellore, in the Karur Vysia Bank, Karur, and in the Kannikaparameswari Bank at Dindigul, that of the two houses, the first defendant was living in one house and the other was required for the residential purpose of the second defendant, that no income was derived from the immoveable properties, that only a sum of Rs. 670 per year was the income from the cash deposits and the balance that remained after the payment of house tax was the net income of the widow, and that she was also bound to pay maintenance to defendants 2 and 3 at the rate of Rs. 7 and Rs. 10 per month respectively. But by the date of the decree in the lower Court the third defendant seems to have died. In regard to the allegation regarding waste the learned District Judge found that the plaintiffs were unable to adduce any specific acts of waste committed by the first defendant. He was however of the opinion that there were sufficient grounds for the plaintiffs to entertain a reasonable apprehension that the cash which forms the bulk of the estate would disappear unless some safeguard was provided. He therefore passed the following decree: In the result, there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiffs directing that the first defendant may be at liberty to renew the deposits now lying in the Vellore and Karur Banks and that if at any time she desired to withdraw the deposits or re-invest them in other securities, public or private, she shall be entitled to do so but only on her application to the Court and after notice to the plaintiff of her intention to do so. The object of this notice would be to enable the reversioners to take such steps as they may be advised to take, with a view to prevent the first defendant from dealing with the money in the manner proposed by her. In other words, such questions as may be raised in that behalf shall not be liable to be investigated or determined in the course of the execution of this decree but only in a separate suit. In view of the fact that the plaintiffs have made exaggerated allegations and their success is partial, I would direct that each party shall bear his or her own costs of the suit.

(2.) The plaintiffs have filed the appeal objecting to the decree on the ground that, on the findings arrived at, the lower Court should have granted an injunction in the terms of the plaint. The first defendant has filed a memorandum of cross- objections urging that on the findings arrived at by the lower Court no case was made out for restraining her from dealing with the property.

(3.) The learned Advocate-General on behalf of the first defendant contended that, in view of the finding of the learned District Judge that no specific acts of waste or mismanagement by the first defendant were proved by the plaintiffs, the learned Judge ought to have dismissed the suit. He relied on Venkamma V/s. Narasimham , and the decision in Hurrydoss Dutt V/s. Sreemutty Uppoornah Dossee (1856) 6 M.I.A. 433, in support of his contention. It is no doubt true that the nature of the estate taken by a mother inheriting the property of her son is the same as that taken by a widow inheriting the property of her husband, that she is not a trustee for the. reversioners and that whether the property is moveable or immoveable, she is entitled to have possession thereof and enjoy the same in accordance with the powers which the Hindu law confers on her. But her powers of disposal over the corpus of the estate are limited. She can only deal with and dispose of the property for purposes which are sanctioned by Hindu law; but where she acts in excess of her powers, there can be no doubt that she can always be restrained. Though no specific acts of waste or mismanagement are proved yet where the property is moveable or cash and her conduct is such as to raise a reasonable apprehension that if she is allowed to have uncontrolled possession of it she would not administer it in accordance with the powers which the law confers upon her it is open to the Court to give such appropriate relief to the reversioner as would secure the property from being spent away for purposes other than those sanctioned by Hindu law. Such reliefs have always been given by Courts : vide Durganath Pramanik V/s. Chintamani Dassi (1903) I.L.R. 31 Cal. 214. That the Court's power of interference is not limited to cases where a widow has been actually guilty of any specific act of waste or mismanagement but extends to cases where reasonable apprehension of waste is made out is clear from the decision in Hurry doss Dutt V/s. Sreemutti Uppoornah Dossee (1856) 6 M.I.A. 433. The Right Honourable Pemberton Leigh after referring to the case of Cassinath Bysack v. Hurrosoondary Dassee (1826) Clarke's Rules and Orders (Appeal) 91, observed that the law was perfectly settled by that decision and it was followed by Sir Lawrence Peel, the learned Chief Justice of Bengal, whose judgment was under review in the said case. With reference to the facts of the particular case before him he applied the principle of that decision thus: Can it be said that the respondent, who, according to the ordinary Hindu custom, keeps in her house a certain portion of the money having in the course of three months, invested Rs. 39,000, three-fourths or at least two-thirds, of the money in other securities, was guilty of a devastavit, or showed the slightest intention of committing a devastavit in this respect? Their Lordships are of opinion that no such case is made out.