HAJI EAKUB SHAIKH Vs. SAMJAN BIBI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This rule arises with reference to an application filed by the judgment-debtors, who are the petitioners before this Court, for the purpose of setting aside a certain rent sale which had been held on 11 July 1938. The learned Munsif allowed the petitioners application by his order dated 30 November 1938, his order being to the following effect: Ordered therefore that the application will be allowed and the sale set aside on deposit of the decretal amount and legal compensation to which the auction- purchaser is entitled within ten days, failing which the present application will stand rejected.

(2.) On 10 December 1938 the petitioners filed an application in which they asked for an extension of the time allowed under the order of 30 November 1938 for the purpose of depositing the dues of the decree-holder. The learned Munsif thereupon granted an extension of time until 20 December 1938, on which date the deposit was made and the rent sale was set aside. An appeal was then taken by the decree holder to the Court of the learned District Judge who held that the trial Courts acted without jurisdiction in granting an extension of time on 10 December 1938. The learned Judge therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the trial Court and directed that the application under Section 174, Ben. Ten. Act, should stand rejected.

(3.) The main point urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioners in support of this rule is that the trial Court had jurisdiction to allow the petitioners an extension of time having regard to the provisions of Section 148, Civil P.C., especially in view of the fact that the application for time was made before the expiry of the period mentioned in the order of 30 November 1938 within which the deposit had to be made. The learned Advocate argues that in these circumstances, the trial Court was still in seisin of the case on 10 December 1938 and that the order allowing an extension, which was passed on that date was consequently valid in law.