NALINI NATH MALLIK THAKUR Vs. RADHASHYAM MARWARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In the suit out of which this appeal arises the plaintiffs sued the defendants for a declaration to the effect that a certain decree obtained against them was void by reason of collusion and fraud and they also asked for an injunction restraining defendant 1, Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur, from executing this decree. The value of the decree in question is Rs. 2354, but in the Courts below the relief claimed by the plaintiffs was valued at Rs. 49 only under Section 7(iv)(c) and (d), Court-fees Act. On this point the trial Court held that, in the absence of rules under Section 9, Suits Valuation Act, at the time of the institution of a suit of this nature, even although the Court finds that the relief claimed is under-valued, there is no standard according to which the relief claimed can be properly valued, so the Court's power of correction cannot be exercised. Having regard to the facts of the case out of which this appeal arises it would appear prima facie that the relief claimed has been under-valued and the question, therefore, arises whether the parties concerned should be required to deposit the deficit court-fees due from them under Section 12, Court-fees Act, or whether the case should be remitted to the trial Court for an enquiry under Section 8(C) of the Act.

(2.) The main argument put forward in support of the decision of the trial Court as regards the valuation of the suit is that there is no objective standard of valuation in the absence of any rules under Section 9, Suits Valuation Act, and that, in these circumstances the case must be governed by the principles laid down in Narayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Limited V/s. Mafijuddin Ahmad . It is contended that although that decision has reference to Section 7(iv), Court-fees Act as it stood before the Act was amended in 1935, the amendment to the Section by which it has been made subject to the provisions of Section 8(C) has not effected any real modification of the law. It is therefore argued that the circumstances in which the Court is empowered to revise the plaintiff's valuation must be strictly limited to the grounds contemplated in the decision in the case cited above and that in view of those principles the plaintiffs were justified in placing their own valuation upon the relief claimed by them in this suit. In this connexion particular reliance is placed upon some observations of Mukerji J. who delivered the leading judgment in Narayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Limited V/s. Mafijuddin Ahmad . The learned Judge observed that though it is true that in suits of various descriptions no absolute standard at all would be possible yet it cannot be disputed that reasonable standards may with safety be laid down giving the plaintiff all legitimate option that he may be reasonably entitled to and proceeding on the lines indicated by the Legislature in such standards as they themselves have laid down. But I am clearly of opinion that until such standards are laid down by appropriate rules framed under Section 9, Suits Valuation Act (7 of 1887), it would not be possible for the Court to exercise this power except in those classes of cases falling under the clause in which the valuation made by the plaintiff is illegal, palpably absurd, manifestly illogical or arithmetically wrong.

(3.) It appears from the decision in the case cited above that a point which carried considerable weight with the learned Judges was the fact that in the case of many suits which fall within Section 7(iv), Court-fees Act, "no real objective standard of valuation would be possible or, even if possible, would be altogether satisfactory." At the same time, it must be remembered that at that time there was no procedure in existence, in the absence of rules under Section 9, Suits Valuation Act, under which the relief sought in these cases could be valued. This defect has now been supplied. The relief claimed in this class of suits must obviously have some value of the plaintiff and, in view of the provisions of Secs.8(B) and 8 (C), Court-fees Act, it is clear that, if the Court considers that the plaintiff has under-estimated this value, it is the duty of the Court "to revise the valuation and determine the correct valuation" and if necessary hold such enquiry as it thinks fit for this purpose. In other words, as pointed out by S.K. Ghose, J. in Jitendra Nath V/s. Hirenmoy Kumar (1937) 1 L.R. (1937) 2 Cal. 501, the effect of the new provisions is, to some extent, to remove the disadvantage under which the Court laboured by reason of the non-existence of rules framed under the Suits Valuation Act, though it may be that the advance is little where there is no objective standard of valuation forthcoming.