MUNICIPAL BOARD Vs. LMORADHUJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiff claimed a sum of money on account of rent under an alleged contract between him and the Municipal Board of Etah. It appears that the officers of the Board agreed to take two plots of land on lease from the plaintiff to use as a motor stand. The matter was placed before the Board and a resolution was passed that the contract should be entered into and that the Secretary of the Board should sign the contract. The Secretary consequently signed an agreement with the plaintiff, but that was not sufficient under the U.P. Municipalities Act, to create a contract binding on the Board. The term of the agreement was that the Board should pay Rs. 25 a month as rent for these two plots, that is, it would pay a sum of Rs. 300 in the financial year. The relevant provision of Section 97, U.P. Municipalities Act, is that every contract made by or on behalf of a Board whereof the value and amount exceeds Rs. 250 shall be in writing and every such contract shall be signed by the Chairman, or a Vice-Chairman and by the Executive Officer or a Secretary. This agreement though reduced to writing was not signed by either the Chairman or a Vice-Chairman and it was therefore not binding upon the Board because there is an express provision in Section 97 and a contract executed otherwise than in conformity with the other provisions of the Section shall not be binding on the Board.

(2.) Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to Sub-section (2), Clause (b) of Section 97 which says that a contract of this nature may, instead of being signed by the Chairman or a Vice-Chairman and by the Executive Officer and a Secretary, be signed by any person or persons empowered under sub-ss. (2) or (3) of Section 96. This Section says that the sanction of the Board by a resolution is required in the case of every contract involving a value or amount exceeding Rs. 1000 in the case of a contract by the Board of a city and Rs. 250 in every other case and that any contract other than a contract so described may be sanctioned by a resolution of the Board or by a committee of the Board empowered in this behalf by a regulation or by any one or more than one officer or servant of the Board so empowered. A city is defined in the Municipalities Act as an area with a population of more than one hundred thousand people. Nobody would contend that Etah is a city. It follows therefore that the contract with which we are concerned was one which required the sanction of the Board by a resolution under Section 96 and it was not one of those other contracts which could be entered into by a committee of the Board or by any officer or servant of the Board. It follows therefore that it was not a contract which could be signed by any person or persons empowered under sub-ss. (2) or (3) of Section 96. There can be no doubt that the contract was not binding on the Board and consequently no decree can be passed against the Board for rent upon the terms of the contract.

(3.) Learned counsel has suggested that the contract may not be binding but that the Board took possession of the land and that it is liable upon the principle of part performance as set forth in Section 53-A, T.P. Act. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Das V/s. Dantmara Tea Co. Ltd. have held that the right conferred by Section 53-A is a right available to the defendant to protect his position and that the Section is so framed as to impose a statutory bar on the transferor but confers no active title on the transferee. It may be that their Lordships were referring when they spoke of a defendant to the particular facts of the case before them but there can be no doubt that they intended to hold that the rights arising out of the principle of part performance are those only which are conferred by the Section, and a perusal of the Section will clearly show that no rights are conferred at all on the transferor but only on the transferee. It may be that the latter could enforce his rights as a plaintiff if the transferor did some wrongful act in contravention of the terms of the Section, but it is quite clear that the transferor cannot enforce any rights at all. In the case before me the plaintiff is the transferor and he cannot base any claim upon the provisions of the Section.