(1.) The original plaintiff in this suit was one Sudhirendra, the fourth son of Jogendra. Jogendra was the eldest son of Debendra and Debendra was the eldest son of Mohesh. The parties are governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu law. Mohesh, the plaintiff's great- grandfather, died in 1874 having left his property to be divided, after the death of his wife and upon the youngest of his grandsons who should be living at the time of his-decease attaining full age, among his grandsons in equal shares. Pour grandsons were born in the lifetime of Mohesh of whom the plaintiff's father Jogendra was one. There is a quests as to the fifth grandson-whether, allowance being made for the period of gestation, he too is not to be considered as having been born a the lifetime of his grandfather. Debendra was the executor to the Will of Mohesh, probate having been granted to him on 10 July 1874. Debendra died in 1901 having by his will appointed Jogendra to be his executor. He dedicated all his real property, with a certain exception, to a Thakurani called Annapurna Debi providing that, upon the death of his wife, his sons and their heirs should be shebaits alternately and successively for one calendar month each and that the shebaits and their families should get maintenance and residence out of the debutter property. A question has been raised whether this dedication was an absolute dedication to the deity or whether it merely constituted a charge upon the immovable property of the testator subject to which such property descends as upon an intestacy to the heirs of Debendra. Mohesh at his death had left certain properties and Debendra at his death was in possession of a good many other properties. As to these latter it has been contended that they were really acquired out of the estate of Mohesh and are not to be regarded as belonging solely to Debendra's estate. Probate of Debendra's Will was granted to Jogendra in 1902.
(2.) In 1915 a suit (No. 372 of 1915) was brought in this Court by Rabindra, Debendra's seventh and youngest son, who was born after the death of Mohesh. In this suit Jogendra and his brothers were impleaded as defendants and the plaintiff claimed that he was equally entitled with his brothers to share in the estate of Mohesh and in the estate of Debendra and asked for administration and partition of both estates upon this basis. A receiver was appointed in this suit which dragged on for a long time, an order of reference to arbitration being made in 1917 and revoked in 1920. In 1919 Kamini died : she was Debendra's widow and shebait under his Will, her sons became shebaits on her death. On 12 March 1921 Jogendra, defendant 1, died pending suit and his four sons, including the present plaintiff Sudhirendra, were substituted in his stead. Sudhirendra being a minor, his elder brother Eanendra was appointed to be his guardian-ad-litem. On 6 June 1922, the suit terminated in a consent decree and it is with the validity of this consent decree and the question whether, in the events which have happened, it is still binding upon the parties that we are concerned in the present suit.
(3.) The proceedings which led up to the consent decree are set forth in the judgment of the learned Judge. It seems that on 15 February an order was obtained adjourning the hearing of the case for a month on the ground that there were proposals for settlement. On 17th March another month's adjournment was obtained for the same purpose. On 25 April a week's adjournment was given and the case came into the list and was marked "for settlement." On 5 May the suit was again adjourned for five days and on 11 May for a further four days. The terms of settlement were then reduced to writing and sent to the solicitors acting for the various parties for their approval. The learned Judge has held that the whole of the matter in dispute between the parties were thoroughly canvassed. We have the correspondence in which the solicitors for the plaintiff in that suit addressed the solicitors for Sudhirendra's guardian- ad-litem and obtained approval of the proposed terms subject to a certificate being obtained from the Court that they were for the benefit of the infant. On 6 June 1922 the agreement of the parties was laid before my learned brother sitting at first instance and by his decree it was recited that this Court being of opinion that it would be for the benefit of the infant defendant Sudhirendra Deb Manna that the following decree should be made, it is declared with the consent of the adult parties by their respective counsel that the said terms ought to be carried out and the same are ordered and decreed accordingly.