(KAMMARA) CHINNA NAGIAH Vs. YERRAGUNTLA PULLAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the suit was instituted in the Court of the District Munsif of Proddatur. The District Munsif found that it was a suit exclusively within the jurisdiction of the revenue Court and dismissed it. On appeal the District Judge of Cuddapah agreed with the District Munsif on the question of jurisdiction but altered the decree of dismissal into an order for the return of the plaint to the plaintiffs for presentation to the Court having jurisdiction. The present appeal is against that order.

(2.) The plaintiffs and defendant 3 are brothers, and defendant 4 is their uncle. In 1925 they executed a sale deed in respect of the land concerned in favour of defendant 1, and it is admitted that defendant 1 is in possession of the land. The prayers in the plaint were for the cancellation of the sale deed and for the recovery of possession from defendants 1 and 2 or for the recovery of two-thirds of the land by the plaintiffs. In the plaint the plaintiffs stated that they owned the land as inam, and their case is that it formed part of the blacksmith inam of the village concerned. In para. 9 of the plaint they stated "according to law any sale in respect of service inam land is not valid." Defendants 1 and 2 in their written statements did not say anything specific upon that point; but they denied the allegations in the plaint generally. It appears however that something more definite must have been alleged at the time the issues were framed, because issue 2 runs: "Whether the suit lands are service inam lands and inalienable." It is clear that the plaintiffs, when the issues were framed, were intending to go to trial partly on the question whether the sale to defendant 1 was void because the inam land was by law inalienable. Now of the two prayers in the plaint, which I have mentioned, I do not think there can be any doubt the substantial relief prayed for was the recovery of possession. In such a case, when the plaintiffs describe the land as village service inam land, an artisan inam in this case, and sue for recovery, Secs.13 and 21, Madras Act 3 of 1895 ex-elude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts and make the suit one to be tried by a revenue Court. Kesaram Narasimhalu V/s. Narasimhalu Patnaidu [1907] 30 Mad. 126 and Kandappa Achari v. Singarachari are clear on that point.

(3.) But it will be remembered that the plaintiffs in this case prayed also for the cancellation of the sale deed. That was not a relief which could be granted by the revenue Court. However in spite of the arguments of the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, I think there is no doubt that in this case it is unnecessary for the plaintiffs to pray for any cancellation of that sale deed in order to get recovery of the land. Section 5, Act 3 of 1895, prohibits any transfer whatsoever of such inam land. Mr. Seshagiri Rao has contended, though it does not appear to be of immediate advantage to his clients to do so, that the decision of Devadoss, J., in Venkamma V/s. Chinna Appalaswamy , shows that the sale of such land by an artisan inamdar is not void but holds good for the period of his tenure of office. Certainly Devadoss, J. was of that opinion. But with the greatest respect I am unable to agree with him in that interpretation of the section. He did not discuss the wording of the section nor give any reason for his view, which is opposed to the opinion indicated by Miller, J., in Kesaram Narasimhalu V/s. Narasimhalu Patnaidu and what is of more importance, is directly contrary to the opinion of the Full Bench in Sannamma V/s. Radhaboyi [1918] 41 Mad. 418. It is true that the Full Bench in the latter case were dealing with an inam in a proprietary estate. But they arrived at their conclusion by interpreting Section 5, Act 3 of 1895 and expressed the opinion that a mortgage by an inamdar, who would come within that section, as the blacksmith inamdars did in this case, was null and void from the beginning. I have no doubt that, if that opinion of the Full Bench had been brought to Devadoss, J.'s notice, he would have followed it, as we are bound to do. Therefore in order to obtain recovery of this land the plaintiffs need not get this sale deed cancelled. As Mr. Seshagiri Rao has pointed out, recovery alone will not give them exactly what they have asked for in the suit. He represents that his clients for some reason-apparently because they are afraid that, if the land is recovered from defendant 1, he may demand compensation from them-will not feel safe until they have got this deed cancelled. In regard to that I may suggest that, if the plaintiffs succeed in the revenue Court in recovering possession-and it is only in the revenue Court, so far as I can see, that they can recover possession of the land-they may either find it unnecessary to trouble themselves any more about this deed or, if they still wish to have it cancelled, there will be nothing to prevent them from instituting another suit in a civil Court for its cancellation.