LAWS(PVC)-1930-1-92

SHYAMA CHARAN DE TAHBILDAR Vs. PROTAP CHANDRA DAS

Decided On January 24, 1930
SHYAMA CHARAN DE TAHBILDAR Appellant
V/S
PROTAP CHANDRA DAS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts of this case are quite simple. In 1918 the decree-holders obtained a preliminary decree, in a mortgage suit. The ordering portion of the judgment therein directed that after expiry of the period of grace interest would run on the amount due at 6 per cent per annum. In the decree drawn up in accordance with the judgment this portion of the order was omitted and interest was allowed only up to the expiry of the period of grace. In the final decree drawn up about a, year later it was provided: that the sum of Ra. 3,290-8-0 as payable under the said preliminary decree together. with Rs. 284-12-0 as the costs of the suit as specified in the said preliminary decree and further interest up to the date of payment at the rate specified in said decree would be payable to the plaintiffs, and there were other directions therein with which we are not concerned.

(2.) In 1920 the decree-holders applied for execution for a sum of Rs. 3,681-1-0 whether they meant to include in this amount any interest after the period of grace is a matter on which the two Courts below are not in agreement. The Court of first instance was of opinion that they did and the Court of appeal below that they did not. The point is not clear : all that appears is that a small amount in excess of interest up to the date of grace was included in it though not the whole amount that would be due on calculation of the interest at 6 per cent for the period from the date of grace to the date of the application for execution. This execution case was dismissed, but subsequently the judgment-debtors made payments which aggregated a substantial amount. The decree-holders then again applied for execution for realization of the balance, and this time they expressly claimed interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of grace. The judgment-debtors objected to this claim for interest. This objection was rejected by the Court of first instance but has been upheld on appeal. Hence this appeal by the decree- holder.

(3.) A good deel of technicality has been introduced into the case on behalf of both sides, for which, however, there is some justification in the view which the District Judge has expressed. The question in the first instance, in our judgment, is a question of construction of the final decree.