LAWS(PVC)-1930-2-31

BALBHADAR SINGH Vs. LAKSHMI BAI

Decided On February 10, 1930
BALBHADAR SINGH Appellant
V/S
LAKSHMI BAI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Baboo, son of Sukhdeo Das, was a resident of Agra and owned three pucca built houses in mohalla Chipitola. On 12 February 1916 he executed a deed of gift of these houses in favour of his nephew Balbhadra who is the plaintiff in this action. This deed of gift was duly registered. On the date of the execution of the deed of gift Baboo owed about Rs. 400 to Bansidhar, Gulab Singh, Ram Gopal and Balmukund. The deed of gift purports to have been attested by three witnesses, viz., Durga Prasad, Brijbasi Lal and Bansidhar. The document provided that the debt due from the donor was to be paid by Balbhadra the donee. It is not disputed that Balbhadra did not pay this debt. It further appears that there was no transmutation of possession. Balbhadra lived at Benares. Baboo lived at Agra. Baboo continued in possession of the houses notwithstanding the execution of the deed of gift. On 17 September 1917, Baboo revoked the deed of gift in favour of Balbhadra by means of a duly registered instrument. On 15 March 1918, he sold one of the donated houses to a third party with whom we are not concerned in this appeal. On 19 December 1922, he sold the other two houses to his own sister Mt. Lakshmi Bai. Baboo died towards the close of the year 1924. The present action was commenced by Balbhadra donee against Mt. Lakshmi Bai for possession of two houses which were sold to her on 19 December 1922. He also claimed mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 20 a month.

(2.) The plaintiff alleges that he had acquired an indefeasible right in the houses in dispute under the deed of gift dated 12 February 1916. The plaint has been in artistically drawn up, but this is not the only criticism that it is exposed to. It has been stated in the plaint that the cause of action for the suit accrued on 23rd March 1926. It is hot explained and it is impossible to ascertain how or why the cause of action occurred on that date. The plaint does not state that Baboo in his lifetime had revoked the deed of gift on 17 September 1917, or that he had sold one of the houses to one person and the other two houses to the defendant. These omissions raise considerable doubt about the honesty of the plaintiff's claim. The defendant did not admit para. 1 of the plaint in which it had been stated that Baboo had gifted the houses in dispute to the plaintiff and made him absolute owner with possession and occupation of the same. By this the defendant may have intended to challenge not only authenticity of the dead of gift but its validity under the law. The plaintiff, was in any case, put to a strict proof of its execution and he had to further prove that a valid gift had bean made in his favour by fulfillment of the essential conditions for the creation and completion of the gift in controversy. If the plaint was clumsy, the written statement was not a shade better than the plaint. It was stated that Baboo deceased did not execute any dead of gift of his own accord. It is not clear whether by this statement the defendant intended to admit the execution of the deed of gift in plaintiff's favour. The position is by no means rendered clearer by the alternative plea urged by the defendant that the deed of gift became null and void on 17 September 1917 (when the deed of revocation was executed by Baboo). In this state of the pleadings it is very difficult to ascertain the exact points of disagreement between the parties. It is to be regretted that Mr. Y.S. Gahlaut allowed the pleadings to stand as they are without any attempt to elucidate facts and particulars material to the case. Indeed the matter went to trial without any attempt to tie down the parties to a clear articulation of the facts which were really in issue between the parties. Laxity of pleadings inevitably leads to confusion of the trial, and confusion has happened in this case, which has warped the decision of the trial Court and has hampered that of the Court of appeal,

(3.) It is not clear whether the defendant intended to admit the execution of the deed of gift in plaintiff's favour. Was it the case of the defendant that Baboo executed the instrument by undue pressure and was therefore not a voluntary agent? The written statement states that Baboo did not execute the instrument of his own accord. No distinct issue on this point appears to have been pressed for. The only issue framed by the Munsif was: Did Baboo execute any deed of gift in favour of the plaintiff, if so, is he entitled to sue?