(1.) This is an application for revision by the plaintiff from an order of the Subordinate Judge dismissing her application for leave to sue in forma pauperis. The learned Judge has dismissed the application on two grounds: (1) That the case is "apparently founded on weak grounds" i.e., "the case is weak on merits"; and (2) that the Government pleader intimated his intention to dispute the allegations of the applicant's pauperism.
(2.) The Court did not proceed to enquire as to whether the plaintiff was in reality a pauper or not, but merely considered her case to be weak on the merits, although the time for the production of her evidence had not yet arrived. The ground for the dismissal of the application is not that the application was no6 properly framed and presented or that the applicant was not a pauper or that she had acted in any way fraudulently, or that her allegations showed no cause of action or that she had entered into an agreement with another person who has obtained an interest in the subject-matter of the suit. His opinion that the case was weak on the merits is not tantamount to holding that the plaint itself discloses no cause of action. Thus the learned Judge has proceeded entirely outside the scope of Order 33, Rule 5, which gave him jurisdiction to dismiss the application. When the case was not covered by that rule it was the duty of the Court, under Rule 6, to fix a day for receiving evidence as regards her pauperism. The Court could not reject the application merely because the Government pleader was prepared to contest it. It is therefore perfectly clear that the Court has refused to exercise jurisdiction by not enquiring into the application on the merits, has also acted without jurisdiction in dismissing it on a ground not covered by Rule 5 and has acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction because the plaintiff has been given no opportunity to show that she was a pauper or that she had really a good case. The order of the Court below therefore cannot be justified in any way.
(3.) A preliminary objection however is taken on behalf of the respondent that this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in revision. It is contended that the order passed by the Judge is an interlocutory order and therefore it is not a case decided within the meaning of Section 115, Civil Procedure Code and that therefore no revision at all lies to this Court. The learned advocate concedes that prior to the decision in Budhu Lal V/s. Mewa Ram A.I.R. 1921 All. 1 there were various cases of this Court in which the High Court had interfered in revision when an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis had been rejected and there were proper grounds for interference. I may in this connexion refer to the case of Malik Muhammad, Ayab V/s. Muhammed Mahmud [1910] 32 All. 623 where Karamat Husain and Chamier, JJ., drew a distinction between the case where the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis was dismissed and the case in which it was granted. The contention however is that, as a result of the pronouncement by the Full Bench no revision now lies. Reliance is strongly placed on the case of Shanker Ban V/s. Ram Deo , which is cited as an authority for the proposition. It is possible that the learned Judges in that case considered that there was not a good ground for interference in revision. But if they intended to lay down that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in revision if an application for leave to sue as a pauper has been dismissed, no matter however illegal or without jurisdiction the order may be, that opinion is certainly contrary to other cases of this Court which were decided subsequent to the same Full Bench, In Shauran Bibi V/s. Abdus Samad A.I.R. 1923 All. 577, the High Court did interfere in revision and set aside an order dismissing an application for leave to sue as a pauper. In a case somewhat similar on facts to the case before us, a single Judge of this Court also interfered in revision: see Lachmi V/s. Ram Bahadur .