RAMCHANDRA BALWANT TILAK Vs. NARASINHA CHINTAMAN KELKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) [His Lordship after setting out the facts of the case proceeded:] On appeal it is contended on behalf of the appellants, first, that the suit against the minor should be dismissed as he has not done anything himself so as to justify the award of injunctions against him. With regard to appellant No. 1 it is contended that the trust-deed and the rent-note on which the plaintiffs suit is based are invalid, and assuming that they are valid, the alleged misdeeds were the innocent acts of the original defendants as landlords, and are not sufficient in law to warrant a decree for injunctions against appellant No. 1.

(2.) I. shall first deal with the case of minor appellant No. 2. The learned First Class Subordinate Judge held that an injunction could be given against a minor and that defendant No. 1 as the guardian of the minor son of defendant No. 2 denied the rights claimed by the plaintiffs, and that if no injunction was granted against the minor defendant, it was likely that defendant No. 1 or some one on behalf of defendant No. 2 would again cause obstruction to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs might be obliged to bring a fresh suit.

(3.) According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XVII, para. 326, page 143, an injunction may be granted against an infant. Reliance is placed on behalf of the respondents on the decision in the cases of Lempriere V/s. Lange (1879) 12 Ch.D. 675 and Woolf V/s. Woolf [1899] 1 Ch. 343. In Lempriere's case a lease was obtained by a minor on the false representation that he was a major, and an action was brought for rescission of the lease and for an injunction against the minor against selling the furniture on the premises, and the Court awarded rescission of the lease, and granted an injunction against the minor restraining him from selling the furniture. In Woolf's case a minor carried on business similar to that carried on by the plaintiff and an injunction was granted to restrain the minor defendant from representing that the business carried on by him was connected with the business carried on by the plaintiff, and it was further held that infancy could not protect him from paying the costs of the suit. In Chubb V/s. Griffiths (1865) 35 Beav. 127 the defendant, a minor, sold articles and declared that they were manufactured by the plaintiff Chubb, and it was held that he having done that was not at liberty to say that he was ignorant of the fact and that he was bound to make a proper inquiry before he made so positive a representation. In Mahraraj Bahadur Singh V/s. Paresh Nath Singh (1904) I.L.R. 31 Cal. 839 it was held that a minor is not responsible for a tort committed by the manager of his estate provided the tortious act was not in connection with the management of the estate. In that case a decree for damages was set aside on the ground that the minor could not be held liable for a tort committed by a person who happened to be his manager, but the decree for injunction was allowed to stand on the ground that people in the employ of the minor committed acts of destruction complained of and that the same work of destruction might be repeated. It would, therefore, appear from the decided cases that minority per se is not a ground for refusing an injunction, but before an injunction can be granted against a minor, it must be shown that the acts were done by him personally or by some one on his behalf or at his instance.