THOLETI RAMIAH Vs. KONALA BRAHMIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Mr. Lakshmanna has argued this case at great length, but I am afraid I cannot uphold his contention. The facts may be briefly stated. The property belonged to Ramiah, who was the last full owner. During his minority, his mother, acting as his guardian, sold the property in 1873 to a person through whom the defendants claim. Ramiah died whilst still an infant in 1879 or 1880. After his death, his mother, as his heir, took possession of his other property and died in 1921. This suit was brought in 1922 by a reversionary heir for recovery of the suit item. Both the Lower Courts have held that the suit is barred by limitation. Mr. Lakshmanna contends that this decision is wrong,

(2.) Art. 44 of the Limitation Act runs thus:

(3.) Mr. Lakshmanna's argument is, that as the ward died before he came of age, this article does not apply. He puts his case thus. The minor's right to recover the property would, but for this article, not be barred till the expiry of twelve years from his attaining his majority. The case would fall under Art. 144. The transaction being voidable and not void, the possession of the alienee does not become adverse till the ward by coming of age becomes competent either to ratify or repudiate. (See Shankerbhai V/s. Ratingji and Chuncher V/s. Martin (1889) 42 Ch. D. 312. ) The effect of Art. 44 is, that the ward on attaining majority must elect within three years either to be bound or not to be bound by the transaction. The period of limitation is thus curtailed in his case. But as Art. 44 applies in terms only to a ward who comes of age, his heir is not similarly restricted and can sue for possession without getting rid of the transaction. I think I have correctly set forth the somewhat ingenious contention of Mr. Lakshmanna, It amounts to this: that if the heir of the minor dying before attaining his majority happens to be a male, he has, under Art. 144, twelve years from the minor's death within which he may bring the suit. The heir, unlike the ward, is not; bound to remove the instrument from his path and is, not trammelled by the three years rule. Again, according to Mr. Lakshmanna's contention, when the heir of a ward dying an infant happens to be a female, the reversioner who succeeds her, has, from her death, twelve years within which he can sue for possession. Can this contention be accepted? The minor on attaining full age cannot dislodge the alienee from the property without first clearing out of his way the deed of transfer executed by his guardian. (Doraisami V/s. Thangavelu ) This rule applies also to the heir of the ward who dies after attaining his majority. It equally applies to an assignee who takes a transfer from such a ward. (Raja Ramaswami V/s. Govindammal (1928) 56 M..I.J. 332.) Is there then any reason why an exception should be made in the case of the representative of a ward who dies while still an infant? According to Mr. Lakshmanna's contention, the heir of a minor dying an infant is in a better position than the minor himself. The present case shows to what startling result this position may lead. Though the suit would have long ago been barred had the minor attained full age and died, the law must treat the claim as being alive, for the benefit of his successor, after the lapse of 50 years. There is nothing, in my opinion, in the Limitation Act which compels me to uphold such a contention.