LAWS(PVC)-1930-11-52

LACHHMI NARAIN Vs. SHAMBHU NATH

Decided On November 17, 1930
LACHHMI NARAIN Appellant
V/S
SHAMBHU NATH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from the Court of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore. It was connected with first appeals from Orders. Nos. 62 of 1930 and 41 of 1930. We have heard these latter appeals and have dismissed them with costs. Those first appeals from order were in matters arising out of arbitration proceedings in connexion with alleged breaches of contract. This appeal arises out of a libel action. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been libelled. The defendants, who were importers of piece-goods sold by auction the goods which were the subject-matter of the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants because the plaintiffs failed to take delivery. The plaintiffs complain of the terms of the notice published by the auctioneers, which read as follows: Under instructions from Messrs. Jainy Brothers, the undersigned will sell by public auction the following goods near the shop of Messrs. Umrao Lal on account and risk of Messrs. Shankar Lal Lachhmi Narain, General- ganj, Cawnpore, who in spite of repeated demands and notice have failed to pay for and take delivery of the goods they had purchased.

(2.) The plaintiffs alleged that that notice is libellous upon them and that they suffered damage as merchants because of it. The defendants-respondents pleaded first that the words were not capable of a libellous meaning, and although the 2nd plea in the written statement is not clear nor drawn up with art, we are satisfied that it amounts to plea of justification. The lower Court dismissed the suit with costs, and the plaintiffs appeal.

(3.) It was agreed by counsel on both sides on 25 February 1930 that the issue as to whether the plaintiffs were liable . or not on the contract, must be taken for the purposes of this appeal as finally decided by the arbitrators if the award stands good. By our judgments in the first appeals from order we have upheld the award and therefore for the purposes of this judgment we must take it that the plaintiffs have broken their contract with the defendants.