GIRDHARLAL MANSUKHBHAI GANDHI Vs. KAPADVANJ MUNICIPALITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for review of our judgment summarily dismissing the applicant's appeal herein under the Letters Patent. The applicant was the original plaintiff in the suit and had brought the suit against the respondents claiming certain rights over a passage or lane which he alleged was a public street. The trial Court held against his contentions and dismissed the suit. The appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit in favour of the applicant. From this decision of the appellate Court the respondents preferred a second appeal to this Court. That appeal was heard by Mr. Justice Madgavkar who reversed the judgment of the lower appellate Court and restored that of the trial Court. The applicant obtained leave from Mr. Justice Madgavkar to prefer an appeal to this Court under the Letters Patent. On the appeal coming on before us for admission, after we had heard the learned pleader for the applicant we summarily dismissed the appeal.

(2.) The applicant has set out several grounds in his petition for review. He has now abandoned all those grounds except one which is that there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and there is otherwise sufficient reason for us to review our judgment. The mistake or error relied on is said to be apparent on the judgment of Mr. Justice Madgavkar. It has been contended before us that in contravention of the provisions of Secs.100 and 101 of the Civil Procedure Code, Mr. Justice Madgavkar has reversed the lower appellate Court's judgment purely on a question of fact and hence the judgment was without jurisdiction. This ground was taken before us in the grounds of appeal under the Letters Patent. In summarily dismissing the appeal we gave no reasons for our judgment. Under the ruling of the Privy Council in Chhajju Ram V/s. Neki (1922) L.R. 49 I. Section 144, s.c. 34 Bom. L.R. 1238, Order XLVII, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, under which this application for review is made to us, must be read as in itself definitive of the limits within which review of a decree or order is now permitted, and the words "any other sufficient reason " means a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have hold that a Court hearing an application for the review of a decree on appeal has no jurisdiction to order a review because it is of opinion that a different conclusion of law should have been arrived at.

(3.) Order XLVII, Rule 1, states :- Any person considering himself aggrieved... (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed... (c)...and who,...on account; of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.