SREE RAJA VENKATA RANGIAH APPA RAO BAHADUR Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL REPRESENTED BY THE COLLECTOR OF KISTNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These three are connected appeals arising out of three suits brought by the plaintiffs (appellants) against the Secretary of State for India in Council as the 1st defendant and some other defendants in possession of the suit lands, in order to establish the plaintiffs right to resume the suit inams and for a declaration that the 1 defendant had no right to enfranchise these inams and also for the recovery of possession of these lands ejecting the other defendant's therefrom. Both the Courts below have rejected the plaints in these cases under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, on the ground that the notice under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code, was not given to the 1 defendant in the manner required by that section. The only question now arising for consideration is, whether the view taken by the Courts below is correct.

(2.) The village in which the suit inams are situate belonged to the 1 plaintiff. It is admitted in the plaint that the 1 plaintiff has sold the suit village to the 2nd plaintiff and under the contract of sale the 2nd defendant has been put in possession of the village also. The plaint seeks for a declaration of the right set forth therein in favour of both the plaintiffs and the suit is clearly framed in such a manner as to make it one in which the reliefs mentioned therein are sought for on behalf of both the plaintiffs. Ex. I, which is dated the 22nd of July, 1921, is the notice sent by the 1 plaintiff alone to the Government under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code. The question is, whether the present suit brought by two plaintiffs in the manner above set forth is maintainable when the notice required by Section 80, Civil Procedure Code, was given by the 1 plaintiff alone; in other words, whether such a notice can be deemed" to be a sufficient compliance with the requisites of Section 80. That section lays down that no suit shall be instituted against the Secretary of State for India in Council, unless two months before the institution of that suit a notice in writing was given stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims. There should also be an averment in the plaint that such a notice was delivered or left as stated in the aforesaid section. As regards the provisions in. Section 80 being strict and mandatory or not, it would appear there was some difference of opinion expressed in some of the rulings relating to this section. In some decisions, a strict view was taken, but, in other cases, a liberal construction was placed upon this section and any defect or irregularity was condoned if it was found to be immaterial or unsubstantial. My attention was drawn to those decisions, but in view of the latest pronouncement by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case Bhagchand Dagadusa V/s. Secretary of State for India (1927) L.R. 54 I.A. 338 : I.L.R. 51 B. 725 : 53 M.L.J. 81 (P.C.) it seems to me that the dictum so clearly laid down by the Privy Council will have to be followed in deciding a question of this kind. At page 747, their Lordships have observed thus : The Act, albcit a Procedure Code, must be read in accordance with the natural meaning of its words. Section 80 is express, explicit and man datory, and it admits of no implications or exceptions.

(3.) Later on, their Lordships further state thus : To argue, as the appellants did that the plaintiffs had a right urgently calling for a remedy, while Section 80 is mere procedure, is fallacious, for Section 80 imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the Court.