(1.) The third defendant in the suit who is the principal respondent before us claimed to have been adopted by a member of the family of the three plaintiffs. Daring the absence of the first plaintiff from the village, the two other plaintiffs who are the remaining members of the; family and the third defendant referred the question as to the letter s status to the arbitration of five persons. One of these persona did not act; the four others made an award giving the land in dispute to the third defendant. The District Munsif decreed the plaintiff s suit holding that there was no valid award nor anything which can be called a valid and binding settlement of a family dispute, The Subordinate Judge has reversed that decree. He agreed with the Munsif that the adoption was not proved by evidence, but he nays that the award, though made only by four oat of five arbitrators originally named by the parties had been accepted by the second and third plaintiffs and, therefore, was binding on them either as an award or at least as a family settlement.
(2.) The Question arises whether second and third plaintiffs had any authority to bind the family by members of arbitration or by a settlement with the third defendant. The first plaintiff did not join them at all and there is nothing to show that, in his absence and without his consent, the other two plaintiffs, the remaining members of the family, had authority to enter into a transaction of this nature.
(3.) There can be no doubt that, if all the members of the family combined and agreed to an arbitration or settlement like this, it would be valid, but that did not happen in this case. It might also be, though it is not necessary to decide the point, that a manager of a family might, by entering into a bona fide compromise of a clause of this nature, bind the family. Even that has not been sought to be made one in this one. Alienation by a member of a joint Hindu family of joint family property for valuable consideration has been upheld in this Court. But there is no authority in support of the proposition that some members of a Hindu family can bind the family property by submitting to an arbitration a claim made by a third person, or by entering into an arrangement with him. In the absence of any authority, we should not be justified in extending the law as to the power of an ordinary member of a joint Hindu family to deal with his share in the joint family property, if the arbitration or settlement was without authority, the result would that is would not bind any members of the family and not as contended for by the learned Pleader for the respondent, third defendant, that it would bind those who were parties to the settlement, though it would not affect the share of the member who did not join.