DEIVANAYAGA PADAYACHI Vs. MUTHU REDDI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) There can be no doubt that the settlement as it is called, Exhibit B, was made with the object and in consideration of the donee cohabiting with the settlor. This can be plainly inferred from the terms of the document itself. The plaintiffs, who are usufructuary mortgagees of the property, obtained the mortgage from the donee, Sadachi Ammal. The first defendant who is the appellant before us is the settlor. His case is that the settlement or transfer to Sadachi having been made for immoral considerations, the transaction is void altogether and the plaintiffs can have no title under the mortgage executed by Sadachi Ammal.

(2.) The facts are that this woman was kept by the first defendant who made a gift of the property to her with the object that she should continue to be his mistress. She did in fact remain in his keeping and lived with him as contemplated by Exhibit B and to that extent therefore the immoral purpose which the donor had in view was attained. It is well established that when a transaction is entered into for an unlawful or immoral purpose and that purpose has been achieved, the Court would not interfere at the instance of the particeps criminis to relieve him from the legal effects of the transaction. In the decided cases it is well settled that a person who entered into such a transaction is estopped from disputing the nature of the transaction, if the immoral purpose for which it was entered into has been carried out.

(3.) The leading authority on the law on this subject is the case of Ayerst v. Jenkins (1873) L.R., 16 Eq., 275. The entire law is elaborately discussed in the judgment which was delivered by Lord Selborne, L.C., and he sums up at page 282 the propositions which are established by the authorities. Then he proceeds to point out the distinction between cases of executory contracts and executed contracts. He says: In the present case relief is sought by the representative not merely of a particeps criminis but of a voluntary and sole donor on the naked ground of the illegality of his own intention and purpose; and that, not against a bond or covenant or other obligation resting in fieri but against a completed transfer of specific chattels, by which the legal estate in those chattels was absolutely vested in trustees, ten years before the bill was filed, for the sole benefit of the defendant.