KRISHNA KONE Vs. NARAYANA DASS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition to revise the order passed by the District Magistrate of Tinnevelly setting aside an order passed by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate of Tinnevelly granting compensation under Section 250, Criminal Procedure Code. Two points are taken, one is that no notice wax given to the Accused in whose favour the order was passed; and secondly that no notice was Given to the Public Prosecutor.

(2.) With regard to the first objection that no notice was given to the accused, the matter seems to me to be concluded by the decisions of this Court namely, Ambarragari Nagi redid v. Basappa (1909) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 89 and Guruswami Naicken v. Thirumurthi Chetty . I can find nothing in the language of the learned Judges in Venratrama v. Krishna (1915) I.L.R. 58 Mad. 1901: 28 M.L.J. 204 to throw any doubt on the correctness of those decisions.

(3.) The question whether notice has to be given to the public Prosecutor is a different matter. The power of appeal is found in Section 250(3); "A complainant or informant who has been ordered under Sub-section (1) by a Magistrate of the 2nd and 3rd class to pay compensation to the accused person may appeal from the order as if such complainant or informant had been convicted on a trial held by such Magistrate." The important words in this sub-section are the last words. These were considered by a Bench in Venkalrama v. Krishna (1915) I.L.R. 38 M. 1091 and Seshagiri Iyer, J. uses a very guarded expression, " Section 250 is not self contained as are sections relating to the grant of sanction and to convictions for contempt. I am not prepared to hold that Chap. 31 does not apply to compensation appeals." It seems to me that with all deference to the learned Judge, Chap. 31 applies to the extent that certain provisions in Chap. 31 have been incorporated in Section 250(3) by reference. This seems to be the view taken by the Bench in Gumsami Naicken v. Thirumurthi Chetti for the learned judges considered the terms of Section 422 and refer to the language " such officer as the local Government may appoint in this behalf." What are to be found in that section, I have no doubt that the proper way to treat this Chap. 31 is to incorporate all that is suitable and proper for appeals in Section 250(3). In my opinion, it is not possible to limit the words " may appeal from the order as if such complainant had been convicted", to because if it is only the form in which the appeal is to be laid, the form in which the appeal should be laid that is to be incorporated there is not to be found any provision for the hearing of the appeal. To my mind every section in Chap. 31 which can assist the procedure of hearing and disposing of appeals according to the principle of the Code should be incorporated. It has to be noted that in Section 250(3) the name of the Court to which the appeal shall lie is not even stated, and we have to go to Section 407 to find which is the proper Court. It is therefore necessary to incorporate Section 407 which provides that a person who was convicted on a trial held by any Magistrate of the 2nd or 3rd class which words in Section 407 apply exactly to the words in Section 250(3) as if he had been convicted on a trial held by such Magistrate, may appeal to the District Magistrate.