(1.) This is an application in revision by two persons, Sukhnath Rai and Chandu Lal, who may hereafter be conveniently spoken of as the applicants. They were parties to a properly drawn up submission to arbitration, dated the 3rd of November 1915, under which certain matters in dispute between them and the opposite party were referred for decision to two named arbitrators and a named umpire. It seems that violent disputes broke out between the parties shortly afterwards and that a considerable period of time elapsed during which no action was taken by the arbitrators. The Question who is to blame, or who is most to blame, for this state of things is not really before us. The applicants finally addressed a letter to the arbitrator and received from him a reply which they have sought to interpret as a withdrawal on his part from the arbitration, or to put it more strictly, a refusal to act any longer as umpire under the submission. Following upon this, the applicants instituted a suit in the Court of the Munsif. It is one of the minor complications in the case that this suit related to a portion only of the matters covered by the submission, so that the suit itself was within the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Munsif, whereas the submission related to subject- matters of greater value in respect of which a suit, if instituted, would have had to be brought in the Court of a Subordinate Judge. In reply to this suit, the opposite party pleaded the submission to arbitration. It then became the duty of the Court to proceed under paragraph 8 of the Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. It was incumbent upon it to enquire whether the parties were still bound by the submission and it was within its discretion to consider, further, whether, under the circumstances, it would elect to proceed with the trial of the suit in spite of the submission to arbitration. How far the learned Munsif went into these questions is really not a matter which we are called upon to consider at this stage. He undoubtedly fell into one mistake. He overlooked the provisions of paragraph 22 of the Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure and, having some to the conclusion that the parties were still bound by the terms of the submission, held that under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act he had no option but to dismiss the suit. Against this decree the present applicants very properly appealed and the appeal was heard by the Additional Subordinate Judge. That Court contented itself with pointing out the error into which the Munsif had fallen. It set aside the decree dismissing the suit, and remanded the case to the Court of the Munsif, with directions that he should take proper action according to law under paragraph 18 aforesaid. On this the learned Munsif passed an order staying the suit. This he undoubtedly had jurisdiction to do and, the matter not having been contested any further in appeal, his order to this extent is undoubtedly binding on the parties, with all that is implied in the passing of such an order. The Munsif went on to take a step the propriety of which is, perhaps, more doubtful. He formally referred the matter to the arbitrators and the umpire, requesting them to proceed with the arbitration. The difficulty about this order is that the submission to arbitration related to other matters besides that in issue in the Court of the Munsif and, as already pointed out, the subject matter of the submission would have been beyond the jurisdiction of the Munsif s Court in the event of a regular suit having been brought in respect of the same. However, the arbitrators and the umpire proceeded to take action in accordance with the Munsif s direction. The applicants behaved as if they were prepared to acquiesce in the decision of the Munsif, which they certainly made no attempt to contest before any higher Court. They appeared before the arbitrators, litigated their case before this tribunal which had been chosen by the parties themselves and took their chance of a favourable decision. Being now dissatisfied with the award, they have, by means of the application now before us, disclosed the fact that they were all the time keeping in reserve an objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitration Tribunal to deal with the matter at all. Apart from any question of law the equities of the case are clearly against allowing such a course of procedure to prevail.
(2.) We may at once note that an application to have the award made a decree of Court was subsequently allowed by the proper Tribunal, namely, by that "of the Subordinate Judge, and that an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge has been dismissed by the proper Appellate Court, the Court of the District Judge. The application in revision before us is against the order of the District Judge refusing to reverse the order of the Subordinate Judge by which the award was directed to be filed.
(3.) Two different points have been made before us in support of the application. It is suggested that, in consequence of the correspondence which took place between the arbitrators and the umpire, and the letter written by the umpire the jurisdiction of the arbitration Tribunal had come to an end, because the arbitrator had in effect refused to continue to act. We doubt whether there is much to be said in support of this contention on the terms of the correspondence, but we have really not felt called upon to go into the matter. Directly the present applicants filed their suit in the Munsif s Court it became a matter for judicial enquiry, in the Tribunal chosen by these applicants themselves, whether or not the parties were still bound by the submission to arbitration. It may or may not be the case that in dealing with this matter the learned Munsif in the first instance, the Subordinate Judge in appeal and the learned Munsif again when the case came back to him, failed adequately to appreciate the nature of the objection or to deal with it in a complete and satisfactory manner. In substance, however, the point was determined against these applicants when the Munsif passed his order staying the suit. An order of stay under paragraph 16 of the Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure suspends the trial of the suit, pending proper action by the arbitration Tribunal. It involves, if it does not directly proceed upon, a finding that there is in existence a submission to arbitration still binding upon the parties. This point has, in our opinion, been judicially determined against the applicants and that decision is not now open to our interference in revision.