GANPAT RAMRAO MASUR Vs. KRISHNADAS PADMANABH CHANDAVARKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are four companion second appeals. In the original suits certain parties against whom orders had been passed by the Liquidator of the Chandavar Agricultural Co-operative Stores Society filed the suits for a declaration that the orders passed by the Liquidator were null and void. The facts are that this Society was in the process of being wound up, and a Liquidator had been appointed. He made certain orders against these various plaintiffs in the course of the winding up, in order that he might get in the assets of the Society.

(2.) Section 42(2) (e) of Act II of 1912 gives the Liquidator power to give such directions in regard to the collection and distribution of the assets of the Society, as may appear to him to be necessary for winding up the affairs of the Society. Rule (4) under the section provides that "where an appeal from any order made by a Liquidator under this section is provided for by the rules, it shall he to the Court of the District Judge . As a matter of fact an appeal is not provided for by the relies, Then Sub-section (0) provides "save in so far as is herein before expressly provided, no civil Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter connected with the dissolution of a registered society under this Act". That sub-section ousts the jurisdiction of a civil Court entirely. It is impossible to see how we can deal with a matter which is connected with the dissolution of a registered society. As was pointed out in Mathiwa Prasad v. Sheobalak Ram (1917) I.L.R. 40 All. 89 though the Liquidator may be probably wrong in passing an order, still, if the order was one within Section 42 of the Act, the civil Court has no option but to enforce it, and no appeal lies to the District Judge nor a Second Appeal to the High Court. Of course if the Liquidator passes an order which does not come within Section 42, that is a different matter altogether. Here these are orders made by him in order to collect certain assets of the company from persons whom he thought were responsible to account to him for such assets. Therefore all these orders were matters connected with the dissolution of a registered society and the civil Court has no jurisdiction. Therefore Second Appeal No 294 of 1918 must be allowed, the decree set aside and the suit dismissed with costs throughout, and S. A. Nos. 881, 882 and 888 of 1918 are dismissed with costs. Heaton, J.

(3.) I concur. It seems to me that the Legislature could hardly have expressed themselves with greater force and greater clearness than they have done in Clause (6) of Section 42 of Act II of 1912. They intended to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, and they have made it quite plain by the words used what their intention was. It is not for us to try and evade or stultify the intention of the Legislature so clearly expressed, by hairsplitting arguments as to whether a particular act or order of the Liquidator is or is not concerned with the dissolution of a registered society. There can be no doubt that all his acts as Liquidator, at any rate in all ordinary cases, are concerned with the dissolution of a registered society, and it is only if a Liquidator s act or order is shown to be clearly ultra vires, that is out side the powers conferred upon him by law as a Liquidator, that the civil Court could possibly intervene. What the Liquidator has done in these cases is a very ordinary kind of thing for the purpose of liquidation. He has done his best to get in the assents of the Society, which he is expressly empowered to do by Clause (e) of Section 42 of the Act, and he has given such directions, or made such orders, as seemed to him in the circumstances of the case to be the most effective way of getting in, what after inquiry he had come to the conclusion were, the assets of the Society. It seems to me that it would he both against the law and against our conscience to hold anything else than that these suits are excluded from the jurisdiction of the civil Court.