EMPEROR Vs. ALEX PIMENTO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Two points have been raised in support of this application: fast that the offence of defamation, of which the petitioners have been found guilty, is not complete as there is no proof in this case that the defamatory words actually caused harm to the reputation of person with reference to whom they were used, and secondly that certain evidence on behalf of the prosecution was improperly admitted by the trial Court after the defence evidence was closed.

(2.) As regards the first point Mr. Thakor has relied upon Explanation 4 of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and upon the judgment of Mr. Justice Davar in Emperor v. Anandrao Balkrishna (1914) 17 Bom. L.R. 82. Apart from the decisions, it seems to me that the words of the section lend no support whatever to the contention urged on behalf of the applicants. The words of the section material to the point under consideration are that whoever...makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person, intending to harm, or knowing, or having reason to believe, that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said to defame that person . Explanation 4 points out as to when an imputation is said to harm a person s reputation within the meaning of this section. But what is necessary to complete the offence is that there must be an imputation with reference to a person intending to harm, or knowing, or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of the person against whom the imputation is made. The expression used in the section is intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm and not harming . There is an obvious difference between the meanings of these two expressions and the argument based upon Explanation 4 involves the result that there is no difference between the two expressions. Such a result cannot be accepted. If the Legislature intended that it was an essential part of the offence of defamation that harm should be caused to the reputation of the person against whom the imputation was made, the words intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm could have been omitted and the word harming could have been easily substituted therefor to convey the meaning which is now sought to be put upon the section.

(3.) I do not way that the question of actual harm to the reputation of a person can never be relevant in determining the question of intention or knowledge or belief required by the section, In some cases it may be very useful to know whether any actual harm has resulted in determining whether the person making the imputation had the necessary intention or knowledge. But the proof of actual harm is not essential.