SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL Vs. GOPISETTI NARAYANASWAMI NAIDU GARU, RECEIVER, NIDADAVOLE AND MEEDUR ESTATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Under Section 25 of Act XXVIII of 1860 (Madras), the starting point of limitation for the appeal by way of suit allowed by that section was the passing of the Survey officer's decision, and in Annamalai V/s. Cloete (1883) I.L.R. 6 Mad. 189 and Seshama V/s. Sankara (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 1, it was held that the decision was passed when it was communicated to the parties.

(2.) The language of Section 13 of Act IV of 1897, Madras, is somewhat different. The starting point is the date of the decision of the Survey officer, and in the present case that is a decision to which the provisions of Section 24 are applicable, and Section 13 is made by Section 25 to apply, mutatis mutandis, in the case of a final decision passed under Section 24. The starting point is therefore the date of the decision passed under Section 24. We find no difficulty in holding that the date of the decision is the date on which the decision is passed, and therefore that the starting point is the date of the passing of the decision. The precedents seem therefore to be in point, there being do material difference between the earlier and the later Acts so far as the present matter is concerned.

(3.) Section 24 of Act IV of 1897 requires the decision to be-recorded in writing with its reasons and communicated to the parties, but these provisions do not very greatly help us to determine on what date the decision is passed. Both sides rely on Section 11 (3) read with 12 (a), the Government Pleader as showing that there is a difference between the date of the order and the date of communication thereof and Mr. Sundara Ayyar as making it plain that it is only a communicated order that sets limitation running. The somewhat peculiar provisions of Section 12(a) may perhaps be explained by the fact that in Section 11(3) the making of the order and its communication are intended to be practically simultaneous--the communication is to be "forthwith." Though, therefore, this provision supports the Government Pleader to the extent that it shows that the date of the order and the date of communication may in the contemplation of the legislature be different dates, still it does not support the more important inference that the Act contemplates the starting of limitation before the communication of the order to the parties.