TATYARAO VENKATRAO VASE Vs. PUTTAPPA KOTRAPPA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On the issue raised by me for determination by the lower appellate Court, that Court has found that the mortgagee had no notice of the plaintiff's existence when the previous suit on the mortgage was brought against the plaintiff's father. That finding is assailed by the learned pleader for the plaintiff (appellant) on the ground that the registration of the partition deed executed after the mortgage between the plaintiff and his father was in law notice of the plaintiff's existence, because that deed had been registered before the suit. It is no doubt a well-established law of this Court that registration is notice to all subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers of the same property : see the Full Bench case of Lakshmandas, Sampchand V/s. Dasrat (1880) I.L.R. 6 Bom. 168. But no authority of our Court has been cited, and 1 am not aware of any, which extends the doctrine to others besides subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers.

(2.) A ruling of the Allahabad High Court (Janki Prasad V/s. Kishen Dat (1894)I.L.R. 16 All. 478, is cited by the appellant's pleader in support of his contention. There it was held that for the purposes of Section 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, a mortgagee must be deemed to have notice of a subsequent registered incumbrance affecting the property mortgaged to him, because it is his duty " as a reasonably prudent man, to search in the registry in order to ascertain what were the dealings with the property, the subject of the mortgage." This is an extension of the law of constructive notice as applied to registered deeds, but that extension is not warranted by the object of statutes of registration. Our Court has adopted the rule that registration is notice from the Imerican law where the Courts hold that registration is, in itself, notice to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees" (see Westropp C. J.'s judgment in the Full Bench case above cited). In Story's Equity Jurisprudence (Second English Edition, Section 397, pp. 256 and 257) it is said that " the object of all Acts of this sort ", (Registration Acts), "is to secure subsequent purchasers and mortgagees against prior secret conveyances and incumbrances ".

(3.) The reason of the law is that a person acquiring a title to or interest in immoveable property should, before acquiring, investigate the title and inquire whether it is in any way burdened, or else he acquires the title or interest, subject to the existing burdens on the property. That makes it incumbent upon him to search in the registry. No such duty is laid by law on a person who has acquired a title to or interest in property to search for subsequent titles or interests. For these reasons, I must overrule the contention of the appellant's pleader.