SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL REPRESENTED BY THE COLLECTOR OF TINNEVELLY Vs. SWAMI NARATHEESWARAR THROUGH THE TRUSTEE CHELLAM PILLAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The dispute in this case relates to the right of Government to levy water-cess on 2 acres of inam land cultivated with the aid of water drawn from an alleged Government source. The plaintiff is the owner of an inam village and the lands which have been assessed with the water-cess have been classified as dry. The dry assessment constituted the inam. Two-fifths of a sheet of water known as taruvai was included in the inam. It is found by the Subordinate Judge on appeal that water from a Government source flows through the Mudalore odai into the part of the taruvai which belongs to Government and thence onwards into the deeper part belonging to the plaintiff. The taruvai receives its supply of water generally from direct rainfall; but in certain seasons and in certain years the odai water makes the taruvai overflow and submerge some of the dry lands of the inamdar. It is found that in fasli 1312, the plaintiff was compelled to make the best of the situation by raising wet crops on 2 acres of his dry land, which had become unfit for dry crops owing to the inundation, with the help of the water which he enclosed in his adjoining land out of the flood-water. The Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiff's claim for refund of the assessment holding that the water which came through the plaintiff's portion of the taruvai was his water and he was not liable to be charged therefore.

(2.) It is argued by the Government Pleader on behalf of the Secretary of State for India that the plaintiff is liable under Act VII of 1865, because the water comes from a Government source and the plaintiff's lands have been irrigated thereby and that it is immaterial that after leaving the Government source, it has passed through the plaintiff's portion of the taruval. There is no question in the case as regards property in the water. Madras Act VII" of 1865 is not based upon any theory of the ownership of the bed of a tank or water-course being the foundation of a right to use the water free of charge. Section 1 of the Act specifies the condition under which the cess is liable to be imposed. The water-must come from a river, stream, channel, tank, or work belonging: to or constructed by Government. This condition is satisfied in this case because three-fifths of the taruvai, the Mudalore odai, the Oorani beyond and the river which supplies it are all admittedly the property of the Government. The next condition-is that the water from that source should from or through the adjoining land irrigate a land under cultivation or flow in to a reservoir" and be thereafter used for irrigating any land under cultivation. In this case water from the Government source flows through the two-fifths of the taruvai, which is the adjoining land. It doe not matter to whom that land belongs. By flowing through the plaintiff's two-fifths of the taruvai it does not cease to be water from a Government source. That water has admittedly irrigated that plaintiff's 2 acres of dry inam land. It was first of all contended by Mr, Seshagiri Aiyar for the respondent that the water became the inamdar's by flowing through his portion of the taruvai. We need only answer this by saying that it has not ceased to be water from a Government source. He next relied upon the decisions in Venkatappayya V/s. The Collector of Kistria (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 407, and Krishnayya V/s. Secretary of State for India (1896) I.L.R. 19 Mad. 24, which held that there could be no use for irrigation within the meaning of the section unless it was voluntary or, in other words, the person said to make use of it had an option to refuse it. It may be assumed that the same interpretation must be placed upon the phrase "used for purposes of irrigation" in Clause (a) of the section after the amendment as was done before it. But Mr. Seshagiri Aiyar's argument overlooks the fact that the old section of Act VII of 1865 was amended in order to get rid of the effect of those decisions and that Clause (b) creates a liability to assessment where the water from the Government source irrigates any land under cultivation and not merely "is used for purposes of irrigation." With or without the will of the person whose land benefits by the water, the water may irrigate the land. We must therefore overrule the argument based upon the employment of the word usa in the section. It was lastly urged that in the portion of the taruvai belonging to plaintiff there was the rainwater which had not come from a Government source, and although the flood-water from the Government source poured into the taruvai, it could not be said that the water from the Government source was used by the plaintiff for cultivation, while it was not shown that the rain-water in the taruvai was not sufficient for the cultivation which was carried on.

(3.) The overflowing of the taruvai in this case was the result of the flood and the flood was from the Government source. Although the flood-water had gob mixed with the rain-water in the taruvai itself, it could not be contended that no portion of the water which irrigated the land consisted of the water from the Government source. We cannot admit that there is any force in the argument that in order to render the plaintiff's land liable to assessment it is necessary that, the whole of the water used should be from a Government source. All that the section requires is that water from a Government source should irrigate the land in question, and in the opinion of the Collector "the irrigation should be beneficial to and sufficient for the requirements of the crop." That other water has also been used is no ground for getting rid of the liability. The question as to the beneficial character of the water taken from the Government source and of its sufficiency are not for the Civil Court but for the Collector subject to the control of the Board of Revenue and of the Government. The Collector in this case having imposed the assessment and he net having been overruled by the higher revenue authorities, we think the plaintiff is clearly liable to pay the assessment,