RAJANI KHEMTAWALI Vs. PRAMATHA NATH CHOWDHRY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This case arises under the Eastern Bengal and Assam Disorderly Houses Act, 1907, and raises a question of some importance as to its proper construction. The facts relevant to the point before us are as follows. A complaint was made to the District Magistrate of Rungpur by four householders, under Section 5(c) of the Act, that certain houses were used by the petitioners before us for the purpose of habitual prostitution and to the annoyance of the inhabitants of the vicinity, as mentioned in Section 2(6). The case was thereupon made over to a Deputy Magistrate, and notices were issued to all the petitioners under Section 2, and, it is said, under Clause (5) of that section. On the petitioners appearing before him, the Deputy Magistrate proceeded to hear witnesses on oath on both sides, proceeding as though he were trying persons accused of an offence, and then himself visited the houses of the petitioners and other persons concerned. Acting on the information he received from these two sources, he came to the conclusion that the case fell under Section 2, Clauses (a) and (6), and he, therefore, made an order on all the petitioners to discontinue the use of their houses as brothels, or for habitual prostitution, or as disorderly houses, within three weeks of the date of the service of the order. A rule has been granted to show cause why this order should not be set aside on four grounds, which we need not discuss until we have settled a preliminary point, namely, whether we have jurisdiction to deal with the matter under Section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This depends on whether the Court making an order under Section 3 is a Criminal Court. The point has already been raised before the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge. The order of the former is not before us; but he refused to interfere. The latter expressed an opinion, which seems to have been held by the District Magistrate also, that the Court was a Criminal Court, but, without actually deciding the point, he refused to interfere on the merits.

(2.) The grounds for holding that the Deputy Magistrate in this case was a Criminal Court are that by Section 2 of the Act the information, which lies at the root of the proceedings, is to be received by a first-class Magistrate, that is, an official whose character is determined by the Criminal Procedure Code, and that Section 5 of the Act mentions "prosecutions" under Section 2. On the other hand, it is argued by the Deputy Legal Remembrancer that the only offence created by the Act is disobedience to an order made under Section 3, which is made punishable by Section 6, and it is contended that no Court can be a Criminal Court unless it is dealing with the commission of an offence, which the Court in this case was not. The scheme of the Act is that a warning may be given under Section 3, and continued disobedience to that warning is an offence. It is to be observed that the Court that convicts under Section 6 need not be the same as that which makes the order under Section 3. Proceedings under Section 2, which are the basis of an order under Section 3, are, no doubt, described as a "prosecution" in Section 5; but, as fresh proceedings have to be taken in the case of a prosecution under Section 6, the word seems inapt for its purpose, and cannot be taken by itself to show that a Court acting under Section 3 is a Criminal Court within the meaning of Section 435 of the Code.

(3.) Comparing the weight due to these two sets of arguments, we consider that the first must prevail on the ground that a first-class Magistrate is a Criminal Court. The meaning of the phrase depends entirely on Section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Code, under which a first-class Magistrate constitutes one of "five classes of Criminal Courts" created by law, and there is nothing in the Eastern Bengal Act to deprive the term of its usual meaning: nor can we regard the obvious scope of the Act, which we will consider in a moment, as having that effect. We do not attach much weight to the word "prosecution" in Section 5, which is plainly a mistake, as the only prosecution possible under the Act is one under Section 6. We consider, therefore, that we have jurisdiction to act under Secs.435 and 439 of the Code.