CHORAGUDI VENKATADRI; ORUGANTI VENKATA SUBBARAO; BODDUPALLI SUBBAYYA AND TIMMANA KONDALARAYUDU NAIDU Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I agree with the conclusions arrived at by my learned brother whose Judgment I have had the advantage of perusing. There can be no doubt, I think, that the so called Provident Fund, with its hypocritical professions of philanthropy and large promises of profit to all, was, from its very inception, a gambling concern, cunningly devised to swindle the unwary and ignorant. Its ariticles of association were such that effect could be given to them only for a brief period while the number of subscribers was rapidly increasing and the number of deaths among the lives insured was few. While this condition of things lasted the few subscribers whose nominees died stood to receive handsome sums compared with the subscriptions paid, but as soon as the increase in the number of new subscribers slackened or deaths increased, it was bound inevitably to become impossible to continue to pay the benefits promised in the prospectus, and liquidation became a necessity. The articles of association are, however, so elaborate and involved that all this would not be apparent to any one reading them unless he was both an attentive and intelligent person, and, no doubt, the promoters of the Company, including the accused counted on this, as well as on the cupidity and gambling spirit of those to whom they appealed, to secure subscribers to the Fund. Among the charges brought against the accused, there were three of having cheated specific persons, but the accused have been acquitted on these charges and there is no appeal against the acquittal, so it is not necessary to consider whether the conduct of the accused amounted to that offence.

(2.) As regards the offences of misappropriation of which they have been convicted I think it is clear that they must be acquitted. It has certainly not been shown that the "Company people" referred to in Articles 10 and 14 mean the subscribers. In fact there is no doubt that those words must be held to mean the Directors, that is the accused themselves, and their heirs; and that both the entrance fees of Rs. 3 for each subscriber and the sum of 3 annas in each rupee subsequently paid as subscriptions were set apart under the articles for certain expenses including the profits of the Directors. The accused were, therefore, not guilty of any offence in appropriating these sums for themselves, and there is no charge of misappropriation against them except in regard to these sums. I also agree with my learned brother that the trial was illegal as contravening the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code with respect to the joinder of more than one charge at one trial. The joinder of the various charges could only be supported, if at all, provided they were "committed in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction" within the meaning of Section 235 of the Code, I do not think that it is necessary or advisable to attempt to define the expression " the same transaction which the legislature has left undefined. Whether any series of acts is so connected or not must necessarily depend on the exact facts of each case, but these are so varied in character that it is impossible to provide a completely accurate definition. There is, however, usually no great difficulty in deciding whether any particular case comes within the rule. In the present case I do not think that it can be said that the alleged misappropriations, extending over the whole period of the Company's existence, were committed in the course of the same transaction within the meaning of Section 235; for, if so, the expression would equally cover misappropriations of a similar kind extending, it may be, over 40 or 50 years. This would obviously render nugatory the provisions of the law which are designed to simplify and define within reasonable limits the charges that may be tried at one and the same time and so avoid the embarrassment of the accused and I may add of the jury, in attempting to deal with a multitude of charges at one and the same time. How necessary is a rule of the kind is well exemplified by the Sessions Judge's judgment in the present case. It is very desirable that Public Prosecutors and the Courts should give full effect to the spirit of the provisions of the Code, instead of straining them to cover doubtful cases.

(3.) If we were of opinion that on the merits there was a case against the accused we should have had to order a retrial owing to the illegality of the trial of the various charges at one trial, but this is unnecessary in the view we take of the facts.