LALDHARI SINGH Vs. SUKDEO NARAIN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The matter before us relates to a rule in which we have to consider an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 145, Criminal P. C.. By the order passed under Section 145(1) proceedings were taken in regard to a dispute as to the "actual possession." of certain specified land between Laldhari Singh and Sukhdeo Narain Singh through their respective tenants, the Magistrate being satisfied that this dispute was likely to lead to a breach of the peace. This Magistrate was afterwards succeeded by another Magistrate in the sub-division of Jahanabad, and he by an order of the 12 August purporting to be also under sub-sec, (1) and reciting the same information declared the dispute to be also between other persons. Together with Laldhari Singh, the Magistrate joined the minor brothers of Laldhari of whom Laldhari was the guardian, and, together with Sukhdeo Narain Singh he added Prayag Narain Singh. The Magistrate also declared that the dispute between these parties which was likely to cause a breach of the peace was regarding "the collection of rents of the lands" specified in the previous order. After hearing the evidence the Magistrate has declared possession to be with Sukhdeo Narain Singh and Prayag Narain Singh.

(2.) The objections taken which have been argued before us on this rule by Mr. Hill on one side and the learned Advocate-General on the other arise from the terms of the order of the 12 August last. It is, first of all, contended that the Magistrate was not competent to add parties to the original order, and that the order of the 12 August was not in substitution for the former order, but for the express, purpose of making such persons parties to the case. In the next place, it is contended that the new parties were not concerned in the dispute which gave rise to these proceedings and that there was no information before the Magistrate on which he could hold or, to use the words of the law, be satisfied that such persons were concerned in such dispute. Objection is also taken to the form of the order finding actual possession as between the contending parties who are zemindars, whereas the real dispute is between two sets of tenants who claim to be respectively in possession of the land, each set as tenants of one of the contending parties.

(3.) In regard to the first objection, it may be pointed out, that the proceedings which have given rise to this rule, were drawn up expressly on the petition of Laldhari Singh. He was one of the parties in the original order and he was mentioned in the police report as being the most prominent person on one side in the dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. There can be no possible objection, therefore, to Laldhari Singh as a party to the proceedings. The persons who are added at his instance were his own minor brothers, co-sharers with himself and under his guardianship in the management of their affairs, and, without any objection on his part, evidence has been taken and the case has been conducted to a termination with all these persons as parties. It seems to me, therefore, that an objection cannot now be properly raised on his behalf. If, on the other hand, it is considered as being raised on behalf of his minor brothers, I am of opinion that it is equally untenable. Laldhari Singh being their guardian and manager of their estate must be regarded as acting on their behalf in all matters connected with their property and, in the present instance, it appears that he was acting on his own behalf and also in the interests of his brothers in asserting their claim to the possession of the land in dispute. In the next place, I regard the order of the 12 August as the real order in this case and I consider that, by passing it the Magistrate intended to substitute it for the previous order of the 22nd July, which, in his opinion, was defective. There can be no objection to such a course.