LAWS(CE)-2004-5-274

SUPREME INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE

Decided On May 27, 2004
SUPREME INDUSTRIES LTD. Appellant
V/S
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this appeal which has been preferred against the impugned order -in -appeal passed by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), the issue relates to the classification of product called 'Plastic Satranj" manufactured by the appellants and confirmation of duty demand against them.

(2.) The facts are not much in dispute. The appellants are engaged in the manufacture of goods known as 'Plastic Satranj', besides other plastic articles. They in their Classification List No. 63/86 classified this product under Charter sub -heading 3922.90 of the CETA and claimed full exception of payment of duty in respect thereof in terms of Notification No. 132/86 -C.E., dated 1 -3 -1986. The Asstt. Collector approved their classification list accordingly. But later on, when there was a restructuring of this sub -heading of Chapter 39 w.e.f. 10 -2 -1987, the appellants filed another Classification List No. 202/87 wherein they again claimed classification under Chapter 39 with exemption to pay duty in terms of the above said notification. But this classification list was only provisionally approved and that too by classifying the product under sub -heading 4601.00 of Chapter 46 attracting duty @ 12% adv. Meanwhile, a show cause notice was also issued on 9 -7 -1987 to the appellants proposing the recovery of the duty of Rs. 1,70,624.28 on the goods 'Plastic Satranj' cleared by them during the period 1 -1 -1987 to 15 -4 -1987 without payment of duty by wrongly claiming the exemption under the above said notification. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand accordingly through the order -in -original which has been affirmed by the Collector (Appeals) vide impugned order.

(3.) We have heard both sides and gone through the record. The learned Counsel has not, in fact, contested the classification of the goods 'Plastic Satranj' manufactured by the appellants, under Chapter 46. What has been mainly contested by him is, that this classification could be effective only from 16 -6 -1987, the date when the Board decided to classify the product in question under Chapter 46, and not from any earlier date. The duty demand, according to the learned Counsel, has been wrongly worked out from 1 -1 -1987 instead of 16 -6 -1987, and that too without allowing the benefit of the Modvat credit and the cum -duty price principle. The duty should have been worked out, according to the learned Counsel, by giving the benefit of the Modvat credit on the inputs used in the production of the product in question as well as cum -duty price principle. To substantiate all these contentions, he has placed reliance on the ratio of the law laid down in the case of: