(1.) Heard both sides. The Commissioner (A) in the impugned order has held as under: I have gone through the records of the case and heard the appellants. There is no dispute that the subject goods are restricted under the Exim Policy and as such required a valid import licence. It is also not disputed that no such licence has been produced by the appellants. The thrust of the appellants' defence is that they are regular importers of the said item and were not aware of the change in the import policy. There are no mala fides from their part and it (sic, in) the absence of mens rea the goods cannot be confiscated. However, arguments of the appellants are not at all convincing. Since they are regular importers of the subject goods they are expected to be more conversant with import policy in this regard and as such plea for ignorance of law is irrelevant. Otherwise also ignorance of law is no excuse. Once it is established that the goods have been imported in violation of the Exim Policy confiscation thereof and imposition of penalty are maintainable and the question of mens rea does not affect the settled legal position. There is also no force in the argument that the adjudicating authority restrospectively extended the operation of the order. It is on record that the earlier consignment had been cleared by them without a licence and as such the Jt. Commissioner was right in taking that aspect in consideration while deciding the quantum of penalty. The Appellants have also cited the Hon'ble Supreme Courts' ruling in the case of Akbar Badruddin Jiwani : Civil Appeal No. 3655 of 1989, decided on 14.2.90. It is observed that in the said case the matter revolved round the move that commercial nomenclature and trade understanding were contrary to the statutory context and because of the divergent interpretations the impugned goods were found offending. In this background the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in such cases mens rea played an important role. However, in the present case there are no such circumstances. There was no doubt that under the policy such goods were restricted and as such required a licence. The ratio of this ruling, therefore, does not apply to the present case.
(2.) Thus, it is clear from the above that the appeal is devoid of merits. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal filed by the appellant.