CROP CARE PESTICIDES Vs. CCE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant is a small -scale manufacturer of pesticides. The pesticides are manufactured in the appellant's own brand name as well as in the brand name of others. Duty demand was confirmed on the ground that the pesticides manufactured in the brand name of others could not have availed of the small -scale exemption.

(2.) The contention raised in the present appeal is that this dispute had come up before the Tribunal earlier and the Tribunal had passed final Order No. 43/2001 -C dated 23.3.2001 in Appeal No. E/2416/00 -C with the following directions: - "5. Appellants were manufacturing pesticides. Rule relating to House Mark is applicable only in respect of medicine. The judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered in the context of exemption of patent and proprietary medicines. That principle relating to assessment of patent and proprietary medicine is not applicable to the assessment of pesticides involved in the present appeal. The mark 'Agr Evo' connected the goods to Hoechst Schering Agr Evo Ltd., Therefore, the lower authorities were right in denying the benefit of SSI exemption by invoking para 4 of Notification 1/93 to the goods bearing that mark. However, while computing differential duty, due adjustment should have been made towards higher duty, if any paid, in respect of the goods produced under the appellant's own name. It is well -settled that branded goods have to be altogether excluded while determining the exemption limit available under SSI notification. Accordingly, in the instant case while re -computing the differential duty payable by the appellant in respect of goods bearing the mark 'Agr Evo', his clearances under his own brand name are required to be re -assessed separately. Net differential duty demand can be worked out only after such re -assessment".

(3.) The learned Counsel has submitted that in the proceedings also duty demand has been computed without re -assessing the goods cleared under appellant's own brand name as directed by the Tribunal and that benefit of such reassessment has been denied. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the present duty demand which is contrary to the direction contained in the Tribunal's order cannot be sustained. It is also the appellant's contention that if the duty liability is correctly worked out, no demand would arise, as full amount of duty has been paid.