EICHER MOTORS LTD. Vs. CCE & CUS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellants herein imported through Kandla Port, CKD kits and components from their collaborators M/s. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Japan for manufacture of light motor vehicles. The goods were assessed provisionally by accepting 2.5% extra duty deposit as per the Special Valuation Branch order. Loading was fixed at 0.25% and Bills of Entry were assessed finally and the appellants became entitled to refund of an amount of Rs. 22,57,188/ -. The claim was held to be admissible on merits but rejected on the ground that of unjust enrichment as the importers did not produce documents to the satisfaction of the Assistant Collector that they had not transferred the burden of excess duty to their ultimate consumers, and hence the refund amount was directed to be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund. The lower appellate authority upheld the order of the Assistant Collector; hence this appeal. On hearing Shri V. Sridharan Ld. Counsel for the appellants and Shri S.V. Parulekar Ld. DR for the Revenue, we find that the issue in dispute namely as to whether the principles of unjust enrichment applies to cases where provisional assessment is finalised, has been settled in favour of the appellants by a series of decision of the Tribunal such as Hero Honda Motors Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi (2000 (126) (ELT) 1014 (Tribunal)), G.K.N. Invel Transmissions Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi ( : 2001 (137) ELT 527 (Tri. Del.)) and Commissioner of Customs, IDC, New Delhi v. Korin India Ltd. (2000 (141) ELT 360 (Tri. Del)). The Tribunal has held that the ratio of the Apex Court judgment in Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India ( : 1997 (89) ELT 247 S.C. :, 1997 (68) (ECR) 209 (SC)) in the context of Rule 9B(5) of the Central Excise Rules is applicable to the parallel provisions in the Customs Act such as Sections 18(2) and 27(1)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the doctrine of unjust enrichment would not apply to cases of finalisation of assessments. Following the ratio of the above orders, we hold that the appellants herein are entitled to the refund, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal.