CCE, KANPUR Vs. CHATURVEDI STEELS, LTD.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this case, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, Jhansi vide his order dated 28.11.97 disallowed the deemed modvat credit availed by the respondents amounting to Rs. 4,34,102/ - under rule 57 -H of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The Assistant Commissioner further imposed a penalty of Rs. 10,000/ - on the party.

(2.) THE party filed an appeal and the Commissioner (Appeals), Ghaziabad vide his order dated 12.11.99 allowed the appeal of the party to the extent of Rs. 1,32,032.00. He also reduced the penalty to Rs. 5,000/ -. In allowing the appeal of the party, the Commissioner (Appeals) relied on the Tribunal's Final Order No. A/204/98 -NB dated 4.3.98 in which the issue relating to the admissibility of the deemed credit on the impugned goods is stated to be finally settled.

(3.) THE Revenue are in appeal against the above order of the Commissioner (Appeals). I have heard Shri Swatantar Kumar, JDR. The respondents are not present but they have sent a communication dated 5.5.2001 in which it is requested that the matter may be decided on merits. I have considered the submissions made before me. The only point raised in the Revenue appeal is that the order dated 4.3.98 relied upon by the Commissioner (Appeals) is subject matter of a ROM application filed by the department on 25.7.99. It is, therefore, requested that the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) should be set aside. I have considered this request. It is not in question that the Tribunal vide their Final Order dated 4.3.98 had allowed the deemed modvat credit on the impugned goods, the ratio of which is followed by the Commissioner (Appeals) in his order in allowing the appeal of the party. The Revenue are contending that they have filed a ROM application in respect of the impugned order of the Tribunal on 27.5.99. This contention is not supported by any evidence. Besides it is hardly likely that a ROM application filed almost two years back would still be pending disposal. It appears that the appellants are not sure of their facts. In any case, on this ground alone, the present appeal can neither be kept pending in abeyance nor allowed. It can only be dismissed which is hereby done.