K. LAXMAN Vs. JOINT REGISTRARDISTRICT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Committee of the 2nd appellant was superseded through an Order passed by the Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies. Consequently, the 9th respondent was appointed as a Special Officer. An appeal was filed against that supersession order before the duly constituted Co-operative Tribunal, Hyderabad. The matter went up for admission in terms of Rule 13 of the Tribunal Rules which governs distribution of work. A single member heard the appeal for admission and passed an interlocutory order staying the supersession order. The Joint Registrar, who passed the supersession order, filed the writ petition invoking Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the interlocutory order passed by the Tribunal. The learned single Judge while admitting the writ petition, ordered status quo as on that date with regard to the subject Society.

(2.) Heard Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, Sri G. Krishna Chaitanya, learned counsel appearing for learned Additional Advocate General (Telangana) for respondent No.1 - writ petitioner, and Sri R. Raghunandan Rao, learned Senior Counsel for Sri T. Bala Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No.9.

(3.) For one thing, the Joint Registrar's order having been subjected to appeal before the duly constituted statutory Tribunal, it is not within the 2 HCJ and domain of the very same Officer; that is, the Joint Registrar; to feel aggrieved and file a writ petition challenging the order which the Cooperative Tribunal had passed. The reasons for this view are vivid; but not, even, enumerable with precision to be ordained with the cloak of finality. Yet, firstly, it amounts to insubordination of the Tribunal itself. Secondly, it amounts to the statutory decision making authority trying to justify its order before the Tribunal, where its decision is under challenge; and even before the superior Courts. This is impermissible except in cases where making of the order challenged before the superior Tribunal or Court is charged with allegations of personal malice, malafides or arbitrariness or bias referable to that individual who delivered the order which has been subjected to challenge. Thirdly; and more importantly; the authority of the first instance to challenge the superior statutory authority's verdict; notwithstanding the applicability of the doctrine of merger; smacks not institutional insubordination; but, an endeavour to assert that the first authority was correct. This would, in such cases, evince subject matter prejudice. The order of supersession was set at naught by a superior authority through an interlocutory order within the statutory provisions. All these factors taken together would show that there is no legal right for the Joint Registrar to file the writ petition, from which this writ appeal arises, to challenge the order of the Co-operative Tribunal suspending the supersession order of the Committee of the Society. What we have stated here are fundamental. See for support Manmohan Deo vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 189, Syed Yakoob vs. K.S.Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, Metropolitan Properties Co., (F.G.C.) Ltd., vs. Lannon and others, [1968] 3 W.L.R. 694 = [1969] 1 Q.B. 577 3 HCJ, Cassell and Co., Ltd., vs. Broome and another, [1972] 2 W.L.R 645 = [1972] A.C. 1027, Ms.Gojer Brothers (P) Ltd., vs. Shri Ratan Lal Singh, AIR 1974 SC 1380, Divisional Forest Officer vs. Pushpan, 1983 KLT 951 and District Executive Officer and others vs. State and others, (1991) 1 KLJ 261.