STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. DULHE SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE instant writ petition has been filed against an ex-parte Award dated November 19, 1994. The application for recalling the ex-parte award was filed by the present petitioners/establishment on August 19, 1995 and the same has been rejected by the Labour Court vide order dated January 12, 1999, holding the same as not maintainable for the reason that after the Award is published, the Labour Court became furtctus officio and cannot entertain any application to set-aside the award.

(2.) THE view taken by the Labour Court that it has become functus officio after the award was published and has no competence to entertain the application to set it aside, is not in consonance with law. The issue is no more res integra, Unfortunately, it has not been brought to the notice of the Labour Court. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. AIR 1981 SC 606 : 1981-I-LLJ-327and Satnam Verma v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1985 SC 294 :-1985-I-LLJ-79 Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that as there is no provision of review in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Labour Court/tribunal lacks the competence to review its award. However, the Court distinguished the review from setting-aside an ex-parte award and held that every Court/authority has an incidental and ancillary power to do complete justice between the parties and so long such powers are not in contradiction of the provisions of the Statute, they may be exercised by the Court/authority and this inherent and ancillary power clothes the industrial Tribunal with the power to set aside the ex-parte award. This view further gets fortified by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430 wherein the Apex Court observed as under :

(3.) THIS Court, in Assistant Engineer. P. H. E. D. v. Immamuddin Khatri, 1996 (2) WLC 342, has held that Labour Court has competence to set aside an ex-parte award even after its publication provided the Court is satisfied that there was sufficient ground for the party not to attend the Court.