DAULAT SINGH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellants who are residents of village Barauli Chhar of Panchayat Samiti Nadbai, Distt. Bharatpur, have come up by way of this present special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance whereby they have challenged the propriety of the order dated 1. 4. 1998, passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 1361/1998, by which the said writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed as he found no merit in the same.

(2.) THE case of the appellants in short is that as residents of Village Barauli Chhar, Panchayat Samiti Nadbai District Bharatpur, they had made complaints against the conduct of one Jagdish Prasad Bhatra (respondent No. 6) herein , the then Sarpanch of Panchayat Samiti of their village to the State Government. During the course of his tenure respondent No. 6 is alleged to have forged certain docu-ments and made illegal payments to one Rati Ram for which there were complaints against him by the villagers of the said village on 21. 9. 1995 and 19. 10. 1995. THEreafter an inquiry was initiated against respondent No. 6 by the competent authority. On the basis of the preliminary enquiry conducted against him the Collector and Zila Vikas Adhikari, Bharatpur, had recommended for the suspension of the Sarpan-ch vide order dated 23. 3. 1996. THEreafter regular enquiry was conducted by the enquiry officer, who also happened to be Chief Executive Officer cum Secretary Zila Parishad, Bharatpur. THE said enquiry officer recorded the finding that the Sarpanch had knowingly made illegal payments to one Rati Ram, who was hired as a labour from the period 1. 10. 95 to 10. 10. 95 and from 11. 10. 95 to 14. 10. 95 for ex-cavation of soil with the help of his Tractor within three days and to complete the work by 14. 10. 95. It is alleged that the Sarpanch had made an excess payment of 262 trolleys which was not actually due to Rati Ram. Consequently the enquiry officer had held the Sarpanch guilty and charges 1 and 3 stood proved against him and the enquiry report was thereafter sent to the competent authority for its ratifi-cation and approval. THEreafter the Director & Special Secretary, Panchayati Raj and Rural Development, Department, who was the competent authority in the matter, directed the dismissal of the Sarpanch and also directed for recovery of Rs. 18,980/-alongwith penalty imposed by way of interest from the Sarpanch vide its order dated 12. 8. 1997. On the basis of the aforesaid order of dismissal and recovery of the said amount which is purported to have been illegally paid, the Collector cum District Development Officer on 26. 8. 1997 declared the post of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Barauli Chhar, Panchayat Samiti Nadbai, District Bharatpur, as having fallen vacant.

(3.) THE short question which had arisen for consideration before the Apex Court was as to whether the failure to record the reasons in the order which was communicated to the appellant-firm was violative of the principles of natural justice and for which the said order could be held invalid? After discussing the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act with reference to amended Section 27 of the Finance Act No. 2 of 1961 including the provisions relating to the transfer of cases by the Commissioner, it was held that transfer of cases in compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Act of 1961 may be made at any stage of the proceedings which shall not render necessary the re-issuance of any notice already issued by the Income-tax Officer from whom the case is transferred. It was further observed that once the reasons were communicated to the assessee by way of a notice inviting objections against the proposed transfer, it is, therefore, manifest that the reasons given in the show cause notice namely; "facility of investigation" can be read as part of the impugned order although, there is no mention of any reasons therein as such. In an appeal preferred by appellants again-st the order of Commissioner Income-tax, if was held by the Apex Court that when law requires reasons to be recorded in a particular order affecting prejudicially the interests of any person, who can challenge the order in court, it ceases to be a mere administrative order and the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice on account of omission to communicate the reasons is not expiated.