BALA BUX Vs. BHAJAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) CIVIL suit instituted by the plaintiff appellant seeking partition and possession of the property in question was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge Alwar on November 11, 1974. Against this decree and judgment that the present action for filing the appeal has been resorted to by the plaintiff. The parties shall be referred hereinafter in the same manner as they were arrayed in the suit.

(2.) THE plaintiff is the nephew of the defendant and Buddhi Lal was their common ancestor. In the first inning of the litigation the plaintiff had filed two suits in 1942, one for recovery of the sum which remained outstanding against the defendant and another for possession of the immovable properties under the terms of the arbitration award dated May 12, 1941. THE District Judge Alwar vide its judgment and decree dated May 25, 1955 decreed the suit for recovery of Rs. 5200/-but dismissed the second suit. THE regular first appeal preferred by the plaintiff dismissed by the High Court on December 12, 1960. THE Division Bench also dismissed the special appeal of the plaintiff on April 27, 1965. THEreafter in the second inning of the litigation the plaintiff instituted the present suit claiming his right on the basis of his title. THE plaintiff also claimed the benefit of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act on the ground that he had been prosecuting his claim with all sincerity and reasonableness in the court of District Judge and the High Court from 1942 to 1965. THE defendant submitted written statement and as many as 12 issues were framed by the trial court which have been incorporated in the impugned judgment.

(3.) THE learned trial court decided issue No. 7 in favour of the plaintiff with the following observations: " THE court has to decide whether the plaintiff has satisfied all these requirements. THE earlier suit was based on the basis of award. It was most reasonable on the part of the plaintiff to file the suit on the basis of the award. When he filed the suit he acted as a reasonable man of ordinary prudence. It cannot be said that the suit which was pending in the court of District Judge was not prosecuted by him with due care and attention. THE suit was dismissed on the ground that the award on which it was based was unregistered and thus inadmissible in evidence. One cannot doubt the bonafides of the plaintiff so far as the prosecution of the suit is concerned. THE question arises whether the dismissal of the suit on the ground of the award being unregistered is to be covered by the definition of the words "other cause of like nature". THE consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that these words "other cause of like nature" must be liberally interpreted. When I put this liberal interpretation upon these words I come to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed as a result of something which could be covered by the definition of the words "other cause of like nature. "