KANA RAM Vs. R T A

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This order will dispose of this writ petition as well as the identical writ petitions detailed in Schedule annexed to this order.

(2.) Before we take up the facts of Kana v. R.T.A. (Writ Petn. No. 2853/88), it may be stated that the preliminary objection about the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and maintainability of writ petitions, which has been raised by learned Counsel for the non petitioners, may first be dealt with.

(3.) It is contended by Mr. M.I. Khan, Additional Advocate General, counsel for the Regional Transport Authority, Haryana, that counter-signatures for a period of four months, from time to time, were done by the Regional Transport Authority, Faridabad/Hissar in Haryana State and therefore, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has alone the jurisdiction in the matter. We may state that u/s.48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short `the Act'), the Regional Transport Authority on an application made, to it u/s. 46 and subject to the provision of S.47, grant a Stage Carriage Permit. In case it is proposed to use the vehicle in two or more regions lying in different States, then according to the second proviso to sub-section (1) of S.45 of the Act, an application for grant of permit has to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business. There is no dispute that each of the petitioners in these cases, reside and have their principal place of business in Rajasthan and therefore, even on inter-State route/routes, in these cases all the routes in dispute are inter-statal routes, falling in between State of Rajasthan and State of Haryana, the Regional Transport Authority has jurisdiction to grant the permit. It has not been disputed so far as the validity of the permit so granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur is concerned, it will be only valid in the State of Haryana on the permits being counter-signed by the Regional Transport Authority/Authorities in that State. If the permits would not have been granted by the Regional Transport Authority on Inter-statal route, the question of counter-signing by the Regional Transport Authority of the other State would not have arisen. So, therefore, in such cases where permit has been granted by the Regional Transport Authority of one State and is to be counter-signed by the Regional Transport Authority of other State, a part of cause of action can be said to have arisen in either of the two States. In the instant cases, in majority of the cases, after the renewal of the permits on the inter-statal routes by the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur, countersignatures were done by the Regional Transport Authorities of Farrdabad/Hisar in the State of Haryana, though the countersignatures have been for a short duration of four months but after having counter-signed, the permits for a period of four months, the Regional Transport Authorities of Faridabad/Hissar stopped counter-signing the permits without making any order in that behalf. It will be appropriate to make a reference to the case of this Court in Mohammed Shafi v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1977 Rajasthan 6, wherein a similar objection in respect of territorial jurisdiction of this Court in a case where also inter-statal route in between the State of Rajasthan and State of Madhya Pradesh was involved and the question of validity of reciprocal agreement/ agreements was involved. In para 21 the Court said that the contention raised has no force because it cannot be denied that the part of the cause of action arise within the State of Rajasthan because the reciprocal agreement has been entered into between the two States in respect of plying of vehicles on inter-statal routes which undoubtedly lie partly in the State of Rajasthan as well. We are therefore, of the opinion that in the facts, as narrated Above, it can hardly be said that this court has no territorial jurisdiction and the writ petitions are not maintainable either on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction or on the ground of existence of alternative remedy because, as has already been stated earlier, no orders refusing further counter-signing have been passed.