COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX Vs. MANMOHAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BOTH these applications have been moved by the Revenue under Section 27(3) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, for referring the questions of law which are said to arise out of the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") dated October 30, 1987. In Reference Application No. 93 of 1988, which relates to the assessment year 1979-80, the questions sought to be referred for the consideration of this court are as under ;

(2.) WHETHER, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in not holding that the onus was on the assessee to prove that the market value of the closing stock of Messrs. Lall's Gems and Jewels, Jaipur, did exceed by more than 20% the value disclosed by him and whether the assessee could be said to have discharged that onus ?"

(3.) SHRI Singhal has, however, urged that the decision in Moti Chand Daga's case [1988] 174 ITR 379 does not lay down the correct law and needs reconsideration and, in this connection, he has submitted that the question of onus of proof was not covered by the question which was under consideration before this court in that case and, therefore, the observations with regard to onus of proof cannot be held to be covered by the questions referred to therein and that the same must be ignored. We are unable to agree. We find that the said reference was decided on the basis of the submission of learned counsel for the Revenue that the onus of proof was on the assessee and not on the Revenue to show that the market value did not exceed the valuation of the closing stock shown in the balance-sheet by more than 20 per cent. and, therefore, the said question was dealt with by this court in the said judgment. Learned counsel for the Revenue felt that the answer to the question which was under consideration before this court in that case depended on the answer to the question as to onus of proof and that is why the matter was argued by him before this court. It cannot, therefore, be said that the decision of this court in the matter of onus of proof is a matter not covered by the question referred to it.