CHAGGAN LAL Vs. PANCHAYAT SAMITI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BRIEFLY stated the contention of the petitioner is that he was engaged as a daily wage driver w. e. f. April 27, 1988 and has continuously worked up to January 10, 1089 when his services were terminated. Consequently, he has worked for more than 240 days and his termination has been effected without complying with the provisions of S. 25f (a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, the termination is per se void and he deserves to be restored back to his position.

(2.) IN this respect, the contention of the respondents is that Shri Bhika Ram, driver, was regularly working in the Panchayat Samiti on the post of a driver. He fell ill and went on a long leave and, therefore, just to carry on the work of this temporary vacancy, on account of the medical leave applied by Shri Bhika Ram, this man was engaged on daily wages of Rs. 20/- per day. It is not denied that he was engaged on daily wages at the rate of Rs. 20/ -. However, as per the respondents, he was appointed on May 26, 1988 and has remained in service up to January 10, 1989. It was contended by the respondents that in the month of June, he has worked for 25 days, in July for 6 days, in August for 27 days and in September, October, November and December 1988 for 26 days in each month and for ten days in January and accordingly he has worked only for 221 days and, therefore, he has not completed 240 days.

(3.) IN this respect, the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to Annexure I issued by the Vikash Adhikari of the Panchayat Samiti in which he has mentioned that Shri Chaggan Lal has worked as a driver on account of the illness of the regularly appointed driver from July 2, 1987 to August 5, 1987 in one spell and thereafter he was appointed on April 27, 1988 and has been regularly working till the dale of this certificate i. e. September 17, 1988. However, in para 6 of the reply filed by the respondents, it has been mentioned that he has worked up to January 10, 1989 with certain breaks. The contention of Mr. Saluja is that these days have been calculated by excluding Sundays and paid holidays and this cannot be done in calculating a period of 240 days. Such days have to be included in the period of work. In this respect, he drew my attention to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation (1985-11-LLJ-539) wherein their Lordships observed as under (542-543):