(1.) THIS revision petition is directed against the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur, dated January 21, 1976, whereby he upheld the order of the learned Executive Magistrate, Udaipur, dated October 23, 1975, who permitted the continuance of the proceedings under sec. 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act"), even after the expiry of six months from the date of the commencement of the proceedings.
(2.) A complaint was filed by the police under section 110 of the Act against the accused-petitioner in the court of the City Magistrate, Udaipur on March 6, 1975. That complaint subsequently came to be tarnsferred to the court of the Executive Magistrate, Udaipur. The same was registered by the learned City Magistrate, Udaipur, who issued summonses to the accused-petitioner for his appearance in his court on March 22, 1975. The summonses for hearing on March 22, 1975, were taken to be served on the accused-petitioner. The accused-petitioner, despite the service of summons, did not put in his appearance before the court. The learned City Magistrate, therefore, issued warrants against the accused-petitioner for his appearance. The accused-petitioner, in obedience of the warrant appeared in the court of the City Magistrate, Udaipur, on April 3, 1975. Later on, the case came to be transferred on August 22, 1975, in the court of the Executive Magistrate Udaipur. After the transfer of the case, no substantial proceedings took place in the court of the Executive Magistrate. On October 16, 1975, the accused-petitioner moved an application under section 116 (6) of the Act stating therein that the proceedings stood terminated after the expiry of six months from the commencement of the proceedings and therefore, they cannot be continued further. The learned Executive Magistrate rejected this application by his order dated October 23, 1975, and directed that the proceedings shall continue. In support of his order, he recorded special reasons.
(3.) IN the background of legislative provision, I now propose to deal with each of the question which countenance me in this case. The first question which needs to be examined is as to when an inquiry in proceeding under sec. 116 of the Act should be held to have commenced. If we look into the provisions of sections 112 and 116 (1) and (2) of the Act, it will be evident that the procedure prescribed for such inquiry is just akin to the procedure for a summ-ons case. Further section 111 of the Act enjoins upon the court to read over the order to the accused and to explain the substance of the order to the accused if so desired by him on that very day. From the combined reading of sections 112 and 116 (1) and (2) of the Act, I am definitely of the opinion that the proce-edings in the inquiry shall be deemed to commence on the day when the accu-sed puts in his appearance before the Court irrespective of the fact whether the Magistrate records his plea or not. From the reading of section 113 of the Act, it would further appear that there is nothing to prevent the Magistrate from reading the accusation to him and recording his plea on the very day. When the accused appears before him or is brought before him. There is, therefore, every valid reason to hold that the correct date of computation of six months shall be the date on which the accused appears before the court or is brought before the Court.