MEHTAB CHAND GOLCHA Vs. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR GOLCHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This order will dispose of the two appeals listed above.

(2.) After hearing both sides, to wit learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the caveator, we are satisfied that the two orders made by the learned company judge, which are the subject-matter of these appeals, are merely administrative orders from which no appeal can legally be entertained. In passing these orders, all that the learned company judge has done is to approve the proposal of the liquidator to run the restaurants situate inside the cinema houses of the company under liquidation through a contractor or contractors instead of the present arrangement of running them himself and through the servants and agents of the company. Obviously, the orders according sanction to the proposals of the liquidator are purely administrative orders directed to the regulation and supervision of the business of the company. The impugned orders do not decide any right to property or the like which may be said to be the subject-matter of dispute before the court. The liquidator who is the man on the spot and who works under the control of the learned company judge is the best judge as to whether the restaurants of company under liquidation can be run more profitably through the servants and agents of the company or through contractors. Such a decision regarding the mode of running the future business of the company must necessarily be left to the subjective discretion, as distinguished from the objective discretion of the liquidator under the control of the learned company judge.

(3.) In Shankarlal Aggarwala v. Shankarlal Poddar [1965] 35 Comp Cas 1; AIR 1965 SC 507, the Supreme Court laid down that if in making the decision, the authority concerned has to go on a subjective consideration rather than objective one, the decision would, more often than not, be administrative in nature. Applying this ratio to the facts of this case, we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned orders are administrative in nature and hence not appealable. The two appeals are, therefore, dismissed in limine.